IS IT “CHARITABLE” TO DISCRIMINATE?
The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for Charities
NICHOLAS A. MIRKAY
I. INTRODUCTION
With federal subsidies to tax-exempt, charitable organizations (hereinafter, “charitable
organizations”)1 estimated to be approximately $232 billion for fiscal years 2007 to 2011,2 the
public benefit of such organizations is an increasingly hot topic for Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service (hereinafter, the “IRS”), and the entire nonprofit sector. In addition to the hefty
economic cost of supporting tax-exempt, charitable organizations via the charitable contributions
deduction, concerns over excessive compensation to nonprofit executives, the amount of charity
care provided by nonprofit versus for-profit hospitals, and responsible corporate governance in
the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals have led to a call for increased scrutiny of, and
accountability by, such organizations.3 Furthermore, the IRS’s inquiry into the alleged political
campaign activities of charitable organizations surrounding the 2004 presidential election
(notably, the NAACP and All Saints Episcopal church in California) are reviving the debate over
the role of charitable organizations in our modern, politically-divided society.4
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1
The terms “charitable organization,” “tax-exempt organization,” or “exempt organization” are used
interchangeably in this Article to refer to nonprofit organizations that qualify for, and have been granted, an
exemption from federal income tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). In addition, any reference to “exemption”
or “tax-exempt” status is intended to refer exclusively to such status under federal income tax law and does not
imply exemption under other federal tax laws, or under state or local laws, unless otherwise indicated. See also
infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for the common practices of referring to all organizations exempt under
Section 501(c)(3) collectively as “charitable” organizations.
2
Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2007,
291-94, available at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/spec.pdf (last visited Sep. 7, 2006)
(estimating tax expenditures for corporate and individual income taxes with respect to the deductibility of charitable
contributions to charitable organizations in (i) education, (ii) health, and (iii) other than education and health).
3
See David L. Wolff and Michael D. Rosenbaum, GAO Survey of Nonprofit Hospitals Latest Step in Congressional
Investigation of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 52 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 265 (2006); Kurt Ritterpusch, Grassley to
Seek More Charitable Reforms Including Executive Compensation Changes, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) Jan. 13, 2006,
at G-1; Diane Freda, Sen. Grassley Queries Red Cross On Disaster Relief Role, CEO’s Exit, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
Jan. 3, 2006, at G-2; Steve Teske, House Tax Panel Chairman Says Exemption for Hospitals Becoming Difficult to
Justify, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) May 27, 2005, at G-1; and Steve Teske, Grassley Wants Nonprofit Hospitals To
Account for Charity Care Activities, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) May 26, 2005, at G-6.
4
See Diane Freda, Internal Revenue Service Ends 2004 Audit of NAACP, Finding No Political Intervention, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) Sep. 1, 2006, at G-5; Diane Freda, IRS Finds Prohibited Political Activity In Nearly Three-Fourths
of EO Exams, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) Feb. 27, 2006, at GG-1; Diane Freda, Church Status in Question as IRS Looks
Into Guest Pastor’s Anti-War Comments, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) Nov. 8, 2005, at G-6.
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Amidst all of this heightened scrutiny of charitable organizations and their activities, the
Independent Sector, a nonpartisan coalition of over 500 nonprofit organizations, convened the
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in late 2004 at the encouragement of the Senate Finance
Committee. The Panel’s mission was to provide recommendations to Congress “to improve the
oversight and governance of charitable organizations.”5 In a final report released on June 22,
2005, the Panel provided over 120 recommendations, including certain governance changes for
charitable organizations to adopt.6 State legislatures are also joining the burgeoning scrutiny and
reform of charitable organizations, with several states considering legislation that stops abusive
practices and improves overall transparency and accountability of such organizations.7
Despite this recent focus on the transparency of charitable organizations and their
activities, one recurring activity continues to fly under the radar of reformers (i.e., absent in any
of the above-referenced reform proposals) – discrimination. As illustrated below, discrimination
by charitable organizations occurs not only in the employment context, but more importantly in
providing services or engaging in activities for which the organization was granted tax-exempt
status (e.g., education). It has a variety of bases, including, but not limited to, sexual orientation,
marital status, and religious belief or doctrine.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale is perhaps the most renowned recent case involving
discrimination by a charitable organization.8 In that case, a local council of the Boy Scouts of
America expelled James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, after he publicly declared his
homosexuality.9 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the Boy Scouts’ revocation of
Dale’s membership violated the state’s public accommodations law, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.10 Adopting a divergent view, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the New Jersey law violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment
rights (specifically, the freedom of expressive association) and upheld the organization’s right to
exclude homosexuals from its membership.11 Aside from its foundation in the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court’s decision raised a fundamental issue that remains unanswered – should a
charitable organization continue to enjoy the benefits of tax-exempt status if it engages in
discrimination?12

5

Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/ (last visited Sep. 7, 2006).
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf (last visited Sep. 7, 2006). The Panel issued a
supplemental report on April 24, 2006 containing recommendations in nine different areas with respect to charitable
organizations. Diane Freda, Panel Releases Long-Awaited Second Report On Needed Industry Reforms, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) Apr. 25, 2006, at G-7.
7
Fred Stokeld, State Legislatures Joining Charity Reform Bandwagon, 108 Tax Notes, July 11, 2005, at 183; see
also, Dolores W. Gregory, As States Attempt to Ramp Up Oversight of Public Charities, Some Look to SarbanesOxley as Model for Audit Requirements, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) Sep. 13, 2005, at J-1.
8
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000).
9
Id. at 644; see infra note 127.
10
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999) (finding that the Boy Scouts constituted a place
of public accommodation subject to the New Jersey public accommodations law).
11
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659.
12
See J. Christine Harris, Should Boy Scouts’ Policy On Gays Preclude Tax-Exempt Status?, 31 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 32 (2001).
6
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Before exploring the answer to that question, it is useful to further illustrate that the type
of discrimination present in the Boy Scouts case only scratches the surface with respect to
seemingly widespread discriminatory practices or policies of charitable organizations:
•

In June 2006, an adjunct professor that questioned his church’s stance on
same-sex marriage was dismissed by the church-owned university that
employed him.13

•

In April 2006, a Baptist-affiliated university expelled a student that
announced on his personal website that he was gay.14 In a statement
released to the local NBC affiliate, the university president stated that
“There are places students with predispositions can go such as San
Francisco and the left coast or to many of the state schools.”15

•

In the Fall of 2005, two 16-year-old girls were expelled from a private
Lutheran high school on the suspicion of being lesbians. In a letter sent
home to parents, the principal stated that although officials had not
witnessed any physical contact between the girls, their friendship was
“uncharacteristic of normal girl relationships and more characteristic of a
lesbian one.”16 The students filed suit against the school for invasion of
privacy and discrimination, seeking readmission, unspecified damages,
and an injunction barring the school from excluding gay and lesbian
students.17

•

In late September 2005, a private Christian school expelled a 14-year-old
student because her parents are lesbians.18 A statement from the school’s
superintendent explained that the family failed to meet its admissions
criteria.19

13

Todd Hollingshead, BYU fires teacher over op-ed stance, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 22, 2006. The article refers to
four other “high-profile firings” of professors by Brigham Young University from 1993 to 1996 due to controversies
with doctrine of the Latter Day Saints Church. Id.
14
Mark Pitsch, Student expelled from University of Cumberlands for being gay, COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 11, 2006,
available at http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060411/NEWS0104/604110369 (last
visited Sep. 7, 2006). The University’s sexual conduct policy states that, “Any student who engages in or promotes
sexual behavior not consistent with Christian principles (including sex outside marriage and homosexuality) may be
suspended or asked to withdraw from the University of the Cumberlands.” Id. In an official statement, Jim Taylor,
the University’s president, stated that “We are different by design and are non-apologetic about our Christian
beliefs.” Id.
15
Robert Marus, Gay student’s expulsion spawns uproar at Kentucky Baptist school, ASSOC. BAPTIST PRESS,
Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://www.abpnews.com/944.article (last visited Sep. 7, 2006). The statement was
released to WLEX-TV, an NBC affiliate in Lexington, Kentucky.
16
Lutheran school tests legality of expelling gays, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20051230/news_1n30expel.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2006).
17
Id.
18
Robert Paul Reyes, Christian School Expels Student Because Parents Are Lesbians, AMERICAN CHRONICLE, Sep.
24, 2005, available at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=2562 (last visited
Sep. 7, 2006).
19
Letter from Leonard Stob, Superintendent, http://www.ocschools.org/letterfromsuperintendent.pdf (last visited
Sep. 7, 2006).
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•

In early 2003, a Catholic independent school fired a religion teacher after
her name appeared among the signers of a statement endorsing abortion
rights in a full-page ad in the local newspaper.20 Upon dismissal by the
EEOC of her employment discrimination claim, the teacher filed suit
against the school, the Catholic diocese and its bishop in federal district
court. The court dismissed all of her claims. Her appeal is pending before
the Third Circuit.21

•

In 2003, a Catholic elementary school in Ohio fired one of its teachers
because she divorced and remarried without first obtaining an
annulment.22 In the same year, a Catholic school in Kentucky dismissed a
fifth-grade teacher after learning she had remarried in a Presbyterian
service without first obtaining an annulment of her first marriage.23

•

In 1998, a Baptist home for children in Kentucky terminated a female
employee after approximately seven months of employment because her
lesbian lifestyle was contrary to the home’s core values. The decision to
dismiss her was made after a photograph of the employee and her
acknowledged life partner was displayed at the Kentucky State Fair, thus
placing the home on notice of her lesbian lifestyle.24

•

A Christian-affiliated law school’s current “Policy on Nondiscrimination”
with respect to both admissions and employment practices reads: “The
School of Law does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but
does discriminate on the basis of sexual misconduct, including, but not
limited to, non-marital sexual misconduct, homosexual conduct, or the
encouragement or advocacy of any form of sexual behavior that would
undermine the Christian identity or faith mission of the University.”25

20

John Shiffman, U.S. court hears case of teacher fired over stance, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2006.
Id.
22
Randall Chase, Teacher challenges church teaching, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031114-113845-6019r.htm (last visited Sep. 7, 2006).
23
Id.
24
Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F.Supp.2d 757, 759 (W.D. Ky. 2001). The home
issued a public statement addressing the dismissal, stating that “[i]t is important that we stay true to our Christian
values. Homosexuality is a lifestyle that would prohibit employment.” Id.
25
Liberty University School of Law Policy on Nondiscrimination (with emphasis), available at
http://www.liberty.edu/academics/law/index.cfm?PID=8533 (last visited Sep. 7, 2006). In the interests of full
disclosure, the policy further states: “This policy statement is neither intended to discourage, nor is it in fact
applicable to, any analytical discussion of law and policy issues involved in the regulation of sexual behavior, or to
discussions of any recommendations for changes in existing law. Discussions of these matters are both practiced and
are welcomed within our curriculum.” Id.
In comparison, the statement of nondiscrimination of the Columbus School of Law of The Catholic University of
America with respect to admissions, available at http://law.cua.edu/admissions/CSL/nondiscrimination.cfm (last
visited Sep. 7, 2006), states similarly: “The university fully accepts the teachings of the Catholic church with regard
to homosexual conduct and sexual conduct outside the bounds of matrimony, as set forth by the Magisterium of the
Catholic Church. Consistent with those teachings, the university does not discriminate purely on the basis of an
individual’s sexual orientation without regard to homosexual conduct or other actions that undermine the
21
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Because many charitable organizations receive governmental support as well as private
donations by reason of their tax-exempt status, the primary question raised by the above
instances of alleged, actual, or potential discrimination is whether such organizations should
continue to receive such tax benefits if they engage in discrimination?26 Currently, federal
income tax law with respect to charitable organizations does not explicitly address nor proscribe
discrimination by such organizations.27 The only possible restraint on discrimination exists in
the public policy doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Bob Jones
University v. United States,28 which granted the Treasury Department (i.e., the IRS by
delegation) the power to revoke the tax-exempt status of an organization whose purpose violates
“established public policy.”29 However, the public policy doctrine, as discussed in greater detail
in Part II of this Article, has only been used as the basis for revocation with respect to
organizations that participated in racial discrimination, advocated civil disobedience, or involved
themselves in an illegal activity.30 Although arguably well-intentioned, the doctrine presents
more questions than it answers, the most important of which is: What constitutes clearly
“established public policy?”31 For instance, is prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation a clearly established public policy? If an established public policy changes, denying
protection to a previously protected segment of the population, are charitable organizations then
free to discriminate against the members of such segment? In addition to the fact that these
questions remain unanswered and, arguably, unanswerable, the public policy doctrine is
criticized routinely because it places too much discretion in a regulatory agency (i.e., the IRS).32
This Article attempts to fill the void in current federal income tax law with respect to
charitable organizations’ discriminatory practices by proposing an amendment to
Section 501(c)(3)33 that explicitly prohibits such practices. Inherent in this proposal is the notion
that discrimination by a charitable organization in any circumstance (employment, provision of
services, etc.) is intrinsically incompatible with the organization’s charitable purpose and
mission. As necessary background, Part II of this Article provides a statutory and regulatory
framework, including an analysis of the meaning of charitable under Section 501(c)(3). It further
university’s Catholic identity.” (emphasis added). The Non-Discrimination statement of the Villanova University
School of Law, available at http://www.law.villanova.edu/admissions/nondiscrimination/ (last visited Sep. 7, 2006),
states: “As a Roman Catholic and Augustinian institution, the School of Law strongly affirms the teaching of the
Church on the rights and dignity of all persons, and hence condemns discrimination on the basis of a person’s sexual
orientation. This position is consistent with the Church’s teaching on human sexuality, which does not endorse
homosexual conduct. The School of Law accordingly reaffirms its commitment to providing an inclusive and
supportive community for all, regardless of sexual orientation.”
26
See David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights
Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 169 (2001) [hereinafter, Brennen, Tax
Expenditures]; see also, David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy and
“Charity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (2000) [hereinafter, Brennen, Racial
Discrimination].
27
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 169.
28
Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983), aff’g 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
29
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591.
30
Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 391 fn2 (citing Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204, Rev. Rul.
71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, and Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991)).
31
See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
32
See infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
33
Unless otherwise indicated, all “Section” references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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scrutinizes the failure of such statutory and regulatory framework, as well as the judiciallycreated public policy doctrine, to resolve the issue posed herein adequately. On the foundation
of such failures, Part III of this Article examines noteworthy proposals that attempt similarly to
offer viable solutions. Finally, Part IV of the Article offers a comprehensive solution to the
problem of discrimination in the charitable sector without relying on other existing laws, which
are questionably applicable or lack the necessary extensiveness. The addition of a nondiscrimination requirement transforms Section 501(c)(3) into the “gold standard” for all taxexempt organizations, ensuring that their beneficiaries are as diverse and all encompassing as the
taxpaying public from whom such organizations draw their support.34
II. THE EVOLVING MEANING OF “CHARITABLE”
A.

OVERVIEW – WHAT IS “DISCRIMINATION”?

Any attempt to define “discrimination” can cause consternation and incite controversy.
Nevertheless, it is necessary for purposes of the discussion herein to identify the meaning of the
word “discrimination” or “discriminate.” A legal dictionary defines it as: “The effect of a law or
established practice that confers privileges on a certain class or that denies privileges to a certain
class because of race, age, sex, nationality, religion, or handicap.”35 The legal dictionary further
provides: “Differential treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable
distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.”36 In the notes to such
definition, an illuminating observation is made with respect to discrimination:
The dictionary sense of “discrimination” is neutral while the current political use
of the term is frequently non-neutral, pejorative. . . . For some, it may be enough
that a practice is called discriminatory for them to judge it wrong. Others may be
mystified that the first group condemns the practice without further argument or
inquiry. Many may be led to the false sense that they have actually made a moral
argument by showing that the practice discriminates (distinguishes in favor of or
against). The temptation is to move from “X distinguishes in favor of or against”
to “X discriminates” to “X is wrong” without being aware of the equivocation
involved.37
In light of the above comment, this Article attempts to avoid any equivocation by relying
on a more universal definition of discrimination; namely, “unequal treatment of persons, for a
reason which has nothing to do with legal rights or ability.”38 This more colloquial definition
34

Tax-exempt organizations draw their support “directly” from the general public by means of charitable
contributions from donors who receive a corresponding deduction under I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006). See infra notes
40 and 41 and accompanying text. Such organizations also receive support “indirectly” from the general public in
the form of their tax-exempt status, which arguably constitutes a government subsidy or appropriation. See infra
notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
36
Id.
37
Id., citing ROBERT F. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS, 11-12 (1980).
38
See http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=532&bold=|||| (last visited Sep. 7, 2006).
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applies adeptly to the above illustrations in that those charitable organizations imposed unequal
or differential treatment in the context of hiring or firing employees, or in providing the services
or activities for which they were granted tax-exempt status (i.e., education). Acknowledging the
slippery slope that the use of the term engenders, this Article proceeds to discuss bases for
federal income tax exemption, including a charitable purpose, and whether discrimination
comports with such bases or purposes.
B.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION

In order to discuss the incompatibility of constituting a charitable organization while
engaging in discrimination, it is necessary to be familiar with how an organization qualifies for
exemption. Accordingly, this Article provides a brief overview of the federal income tax
exemption statute and the regulatory tests that must be satisfied before exemption is granted.
Section 501(c)(3) provides for the exemption from federal income tax of nonprofit
corporations and certain other entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, . . . or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. . . .”39 The principal benefit of being
exempt under Section 501(c)(3) is that the organization is entitled to receive charitable
contributions that are tax-deductible to its donors under Section 170(a)(1).40 For the most part,
only organizations exempt under Section 501(c)(3) are eligible for this invaluable benefit.41
The meaning of each of the eight specific exempt purposes listed in the statute (i.e.,
religious, charitable, educational, etc.) is defined in applicable regulations and in numerous
administrative rulings issued by the IRS. The meaning of “charitable” as enumerated in
Section 501(c)(3) and the common practice of referring to the entities listed in the section
collectively as charitable are discussed in greater detail below.42 In addition to the statutory and
regulatory definitions of what purposes fall within Section 501(c)(3), the IRS has determined that
other qualifying purposes meet the overall public benefit principle of Section 501(c)(3) based on
an expansive interpretation of “charitable.”43
In determining whether an organization fulfills its exempt purpose(s), the language of
Section 501(c)(3) establishes both an “organizational test” and an “operational test,” and if an
organization seeks to qualify for exemption thereunder it must not fail to meet either test.44 The
organizational test relates solely to the language used in the organization’s governing documents;
its articles of incorporation (if a nonprofit corporation) or trust instrument (if a charitable trust).
39

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Specifically, Section 501(a) provides that “[a]n organization described in subsection
(c) or (d) . . . shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle. . . .” I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).
40
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006), which provides that “there shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution .
. . payment of which is made within the taxable year.” Charitable contributions must be made primarily to either
governmental entities or charitable organizations under Section 501(c)(3). I.R.C. §170(c)(1), (2) (2006).
41
Certain veterans organizations, fraternal organizations and cemetery organizations, which are exempt from federal
income tax under other subsections of Section 501(c) are also entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions per
§170(c)(3), (4), and (5), respectively.
42
See infra notes 56 to 59 and accompanying text.
43
See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 178.
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1990).

-7-

Under the test as set forth in the regulations, an organization is organized exclusively for one or
more tax-exempt, charitable purposes only if its articles of organization: (i) limit its purpose to
one or more exempt purposes, and (ii) do not expressly empower it to engage, otherwise than as
insubstantial part of its activities, in activities that in themselves do not further one or more
exempt purposes.45 The organizational test also imposes requirements as to the distribution of
the organization’s assets upon dissolution.46
The operational test is intended to ensure that the organization’s resources and activities
are devoted primarily to its exempt purposes. The regulations break down the operational test
into two components commonly referred to as (i) the primary purpose or activity test, and (ii) the
private inurement prohibition.47 Under the primary purpose or activity test, an organization will
be regarded as “operated exclusively” for one or more exempt purposes only if it “engages
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes in
Section 501(c)(3).”48 An organization will not regarded as primarily furthering its exempt
purposes if “more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose.”49
Under the private inurement prohibition, the regulations provide that the operational test
will not be met by an organization “if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of
private shareholders or individuals.”50 The term “private shareholder or individual” is defined as
“persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization,”51 such as
officers, directors, or other persons in a position to assert influence or control over the
organization’s operations and activities.52 The prohibition is absolute – any amount of inurement
is impermissible.
As mentioned previously and discussed in greater detail below, the Bob Jones University
decision imposes an additional, non-statutory requirement on an organization seeking tax-exempt
status – do not violate the public policy doctrine.53 However, the courts and the IRS have failed
to articulate a clear definition of what constitutes “established public policy,” leaving the
doctrine open to the IRS’s unfettered discretion and allowing discrimination potentially to
flourish in areas other than race, civil disobedience, and illegality.54

45

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (as amended in 1990). The regulations require that the organization either in its
Articles or under governing state law, must explicitly dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes in the event
of dissolution.
47
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), (2) (as amended in 1990).
48
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
49
Id. (emphasis added).
50
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
51
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1990). Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991) describes the term as
encompassing “persons who, because of their particular relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to
control or influence its activities.”
52
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 19.3, 488 (8th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006).
53
See infra notes 85 to 107 and accompanying text.
54
See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26 at 178-179 n.48.
46
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C.

THE STATUTORY IMPACT OF “CHARITABLE”

The failure of the public policy doctrine to adequately check discrimination and the
recent focus on charitable organizations’ transparency and accountability revives the age-old
conundrum of such organizations’ expected role in our society. If accountability necessarily
implies that organizations must accomplish the purposes for which they were granted tax-exempt
status, what is meant by the use of the term “charitable”? More importantly, does our notion of
“charitable” apply to all purposes enumerated in Section 501(c)(3) so that if we conclude that the
antithesis of “charitable” is discrimination, the result is a non-discrimination requirement
applicable to all organizations described under Section 501(c)(3)? An abundance of legal
scholarship and other commentary focuses on the meaning of charitable and its historical origins
in our society and as later adopted in federal income tax law.55 This Article does not intend to
duplicate this extensive commentary, but rather attempts to summarize it succinctly and in a
manner that is relevant to the interaction of discrimination with a charitable purpose or existence.
Organizations that receive an exemption from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3)
are commonly referred to as “charitable” organizations.56 The term “charitable” is used as a
collective term despite the fact that it is one of many descriptive terms used in the statute.57 In
other words, the term “charitable” is regarded as including “religious, scientific, educational . . .”
organizations.58 The collective use of charitable may be attributed to the fact that all of the
organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) are eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions, as explained previously.59 The term charitable originates from the English
common law of charitable trusts; specifically, from the definition of “charitable purposes” in the
Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.60 Under the common law of trusts, the term
charitable encompasses “trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education,
trusts for the advancement of religion; and trust for other purposes beneficial to the community,
not falling under any of the preceding heads.”61
For purposes of common law in the United States, the most important and relevant
concept taken from English law is an “expansive view” of what constitutes charitable.62 Legal
scholars and courts over the past centuries have concluded similarly “that it is not only
55

See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.1, at 103.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see also, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2006).
60
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.1, at 104, citing 43 Eliz., c.4. A review of the Statute of Charitable Uses reveals how
the term became an expansive concept in that twenty-one separate charitable activities are enumerated therein. “The
activities enumerated include not only relief of aged, impotent, and poor people, but also maintenance of schools of
learning and houses of correction, the repair of bridges and churches, and the ‘marriage of poor maids.’” Charles A.
Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 193 (2004). See
also Rochelle Korman, Charitable Class and Need: Whom Should Charities Benefit?, NYU TOPICS IN
PHILANTHROPY (2002), at 3-4, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/libframe.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2006)
(explaining that the “preamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 in effect codified the scope of
charity that had existed in practice for more than 200 years …”).
61
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.1, at 104, citing Comm’rs for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, A.C. 531,
583 (1891).
62
Borek, supra note 60, at 195.
56
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impossible, but a mistake to attempt to formulate a clear definition of charity because ‘charitable
activity constantly changes…’” and the question of what is charitable arises in a ‘number of
different contexts.’”63 This is clearly reflected not only in the current Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, which is explicitly modeled after the Statute of Charitable Uses in that it enumerates
categories of charitable purposes,64 but also in the Restatement’s comments. These comments
provide that “[t]he common element of all charitable purposes is that they are designed to
accomplish objects which are beneficial to the community,”65 and “[t]here is no fixed standard to
determine what purposes of such social interest to the community; the interests of the community
vary with time and place.”66
In enacting Section 501(c)(3), Congress never clearly articulated whether it was guided
by the common law definition of charitable, emanating from English common law, or the more
“popular and ordinary” usage of the term – namely, relief of the poor.67 Although arguably a
semantic difference, it affects two important implications: (i) “the meaning to be ascribed to the
term charitable as used in . . . [Section] 501(c)(3),” and (ii) “whether the entirety of the section is
intended to describe organizations that are in some sense charitable.”68 Under canons of
statutory construction, the disjunctive enumeration of purposes in Section 501(c)(3) (i.e.,
“religious, charitable, scientific, . . . or educational purposes . . .”) leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended to grant tax-exempt status to any organization organized and operated for one
of such enumerated purposes.69 Accordingly, one conclusion is that each of the eight exempt
purposes enumerated in Section 501(c)(3) “are not overlain with a requirement that all
organizations, to be exempt under that section, must qualify as entities that are charitable in the
common law sense.”70
63

Korman, supra note 60, at 6-7, quoting John P. Persons, John J. Osborn, Jr., and Charles F. Feldman, Criteria for
Exemption under Section 501(c)(3), published in Research Papers, sponsored by the Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, Vol. IV at 1934-35 (1977). See also Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 556
(1867), wherein Justice Gray of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in defining charity enunciated the standard for a
“charitable class”:
A charity in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with
existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
(emphasis added).
64
Id. at 198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959) provides that: “Charitable purposes include: (a) the
relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health;
(e) governmental or municipal purposes; (f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is benefit to the
community.” Id., n.65.
65
Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368, cmt. a.
66
Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368, cmt. b.
67
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.1, at 104 and § 5.2, at 106.
68
Id., § 5.2, at 106.
69
Id., § 5.2, at 106, citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“Canons of construction ordinarily
suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.”).
Hopkins further explains that a competing statutory construction canon provides that “related statutory provisions
should be interpreted together,” citing Kokoska v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), which he states is particularly
relevant since I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (definition of “charitable contribution” for purposes of the deduction) “reiterates
the separate and disjunctive purposes or functions described in IRC § 501(c)(3).” Id.
70
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 107. Hopkins further explains that this conclusion conforms with another canon
of statutory construction – “statutes are to be construed to give effect to each word and that no one part of a statute
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Although the statutory construction canons lead to the conclusion that all organizations
exempt under Section 501(c)(3) are not subject to the common law definition of charitable,
legislative history, in the form of a 1939 report of the House of Representatives on exempting
certain organizations, appears to illustrate otherwise:71
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise
have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of general welfare.72
The use of the terms “public” and “general welfare” in the report appears to establish an
obligation to follow the common law meaning of charitable.73 Earlier legislative history lends
further support to a broader interpretation of the term charitable.74
The current regulations interpreting the meaning of charitable in Section 501(c)(3) were
promulgated in 1959, broadening the federal income tax meaning of the term immensely. The
regulations acknowledge unmistakably that an organization may qualify under one of the eight
enumerated purposes set forth in Section 501(c)(3), regardless of whether any such individual
purpose comports with the common law definition of charitable.75 The regulation explains:
The term “charitable” is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal
sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration
in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad
outlines of “charity” as developed by judicial decisions. Such term includes:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and
promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the
above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice
and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by the law; or
(iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.76

should be interpreted so as to render another part of the statute redundant,” citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367
U.S. 303 (1961). Id., n.26.
71
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 108.
72
Id., citing 48 H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75TH CONG., 3D SESS. 19 (1938). See also, Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra
note 26 at 188-189, fn.90.
73
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 108. The author also states that, to the contrary, the language “charitable and
other purposes” may infer “intent to invoke a narrower meaning of the term charitable.” Id.
74
Id., citing 44 Cong. Rec. 4150 (1909) (the sponsor of the 1909 tax exemption statute, which was imposed only on
corporations at that time, stated that the provision was drafted to relieve from income tax liability those
organizations “devoted exclusively to the relief of the suffering, to the alleviation of our people, and to all things
which commend themselves to every charitable and just impulse.”).
75
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 110.
76
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990).
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These regulations integrated “the concept that the meaning of charity . . . [is] not static, but . . .
[is] meant to evolve over time to reflect changing circumstances and the changing views of
public benefit.”77 Undeniably, the IRS has liberally and expansively interpreted the meaning of
charitable to address the ever-changing needs of the general public.78
Notwithstanding, courts have not readily adopted the separateness of the purposes
enumerated in Section 501(c)(3) and affirmed in the regulations.79 One federal court of appeals
concluded that the “term ‘charitable’ is a generic term and includes literary, religious, scientific
and educational institutions.”80 Still another appellate court announced in multiple decisions that
charitable trust rules should be applied in determining the meaning of charitable, and that it was
Congress’ intent to apply such rules to “those organizations commonly designated charitable in
the law of trusts.”81 In Bob Jones University, the United States Supreme Court noted that
Congress permitted deductibility of “charitable contributions” under Section 170(a) only to
certain eligible organizations, which are “virtually identical” to those enumerated in
Section 501(c)(3).82 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to
provide tax benefits to organizations serving “charitable” purposes, regardless of an
organization’s specific activities (e.g., religious, educational or scientific).83 In other words, each
of the eight enumerated purposes in Section 501(c)(3) fall within a broad classification of
“charitable.”84
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University, in announcing the
public policy doctrine, solidified this broad view that all tax-exempt organizations described in
Section 501(c)(3) are considered “charitable,” as discussed further below.
D.

THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE’S IMPACT ON “CHARITABLE”
1.

Overview – Bob Jones University v. United States

The controversy that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University
began in early 1970 with a federal district court issuing a preliminary injunction that compelled
the IRS to deny tax exemption to private schools in Mississippi with sustained raciallydiscriminatory admissions policies.85 Until 1970, the IRS granted tax-exempt status to private

77

MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 101 (2004).
Id. at 245.
79
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 110.
80
U.S. v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1939).
81
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 111, citing Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v. Helvering, 66 F.2d 284, 285
(D.C. Cir. 1933) and International Reform Fed’n v. District Unemployment Board, 131 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir.
1942). Cf. infra note 101.
82
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 587-88, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s similar analysis. See Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S.,
639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980).
83
Id.
84
HOPKINS, supra note 52, § 5.2, at 107 n.22 and 111.
85
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970). See Charles O. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy
Analysis of Bob Jones Univ. University v. U.S., 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1983) (“The Green court suggested
that the IRS would not be permitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate the government’s public
policy of nondiscrimination.”). In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), , aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green,
78
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schools regardless of any racially-discriminatory admissions policy.86 In response to the
injunction, the IRS discontinued granting exemptions in such instances, as well as prohibited
deductions of charitable contributions to schools that racially discriminate.87 In addition to
notifying all private schools, including Bob Jones University, the IRS issued a revenue ruling
that formally established this new policy and required such schools to adopt and maintain a
policy of nondiscrimination with respect to students in its admissions, scholarship and loan
programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs.88
Located in Greenville, South Carolina, Bob Jones University was created “to conduct an
institution of learning …, giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics
revealed in the Holy Scriptures.”89 Based on its founders’ belief that the Bible forbids interracial
dating and marriage, Bob Jones University sustained a racially-discriminatory admissions
policy.90 Upon being formally notified by the IRS of the new nondiscrimination requirement for
private schools, Bob Jones University filed suit in 1971 attempting to enjoin the IRS from
revoking its tax exemption.91 The university was unsuccessful.92 On January 19, 1976, the IRS

404 U.S. 997 (1971), the district permanently enjoined the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to any Mississippi
school that failed to publicly sustain a nondiscrimination policy.
86
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577.
87
I.R.S. News Release (July 10, 1970). See Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 400-401
88
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. In explaining the basis for the ruling, the IRS states:
Under common law, the term “charity” encompasses all three of the major categories identified
separately under section 501(c)(3) of the Code as religious, educational, and charitable. Both the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of
being “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, *** or educational purposes”
was intended to express the basic common law concept. Thus, a school asserting a right to the
benefits provided for in section 501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized and operated exclusively
for educational purposes must be a common law charity in order to be exempt under that section.
In concluding that a school without a racially nondiscriminatory policy with respect to students is not “charitable,”
the IRS relies on the charitable trust principle that “the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public
policy,” citing Restatement (Second), Trusts (1959) Sec. 377, Comment c. The IRS subsequently released
guidelines for determining whether private schools had adequately publicized their racially nondiscriminatory
policy. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834, amplified by Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The guidelines require
schools to: (i) demonstrate their racially nondiscriminatory policy in their governing documents (charter, bylaws)
and catalogs, (ii) make their policy known to all segments of the community through newspapers and broadcast
media, and (iii) keep detailed records evidencing their compliance with such guidelines. Furthermore, in Rev.
Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158, the IRS announced its denial of tax-exempt status to any religious organization with
racially discriminatory policies, even if sincere religious belief served as the foundation for the discrimination. See
Galvin & Devins, supra note 85, at 1358 n.23.
89
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579-580. Although not affiliated with any particular Christian denomination, the
university is “dedicated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs.” Id. at 580.
90
Id. at 580. Specifically, the university admitted no black students until 1971. From 1971 to May 1975, it
continued its discrimination against unmarried blacks, but accepted applications from black students married within
their race. Id. In accordance with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.
1975), aff’d 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which determined that racial exclusion from private schools was illegal, the
university admitted unmarried blacks. However, it maintained a disciplinary rule that prohibited interracial dating
and marriage, and denied admissions to prospective students and expelled enrolled students that violated the rule.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580-581.
91
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. The university received a letter from the IRS dated November 30, 1970. In
addition to stating the IRS’s new policy, the letter also announced the IRS’s “intention to challenge the tax-exempt
status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions policies.” Id.
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revoked the university’s charitable exemption retroactive to the date the university was notified
by letter of the IRS’s change in policy for private schools.93 As a vehicle for challenging the
revocation of its exemption, the university filed suit in federal district court seeking a refund of
federal unemployment tax paid to the IRS. The government counterclaimed for unpaid taxes.
The district court determined that the revocation of the university’s exempt status exceeded the
IRS’s delegated powers (from the Department of the Treasury) and violated the university’s First
Amendment religious rights.94 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court decision on appeal,
stating that an educational institution must be “charitable in the common law sense, and . . . not
be contrary to public policy” to be eligible for exemption.95 Furthermore, the court determined
that the university clearly failed this requirement since its “racial policies violated the clearly
defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial discrimination and, more
specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education, public
or private.”96
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision by a
vote of eight to one, upholding the IRS’s revocation of Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt
status.97 The Supreme Court noted that since the IRS’s announced policy change in 1970, an
organization, in order to qualify for exempt status under Section 501(c)(3), must first within one
of the eight categories set forth in the statute and, second, demonstrate that its activities are not
contrary to established public policy.98 In response to the university’s argument that the eight
categories in the statute are disjunctive and, thus, an organization need not also qualify as
“charitable” to be tax-exempt, the Court observed that although Section 501(c)(3) does not
explicitly impose a public policy limitation, Congress nevertheless intended that “entitlement to
tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity – namely, that an
institution . . . must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.”99
The Court further observed the interactions between Sections 170 and 501(c)(3), explaining that
“§ 170 reveals that Congress’ intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations serving
92

In Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), the Supreme Court determined that I.R.C. §7421(a) (the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act) did not permit the university to obtain judicial review through an injunctive action prior to the
assessment or collection of any tax. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581.
93
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581.
94
Id. at 582.
95
Id. See Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d at 147.
96
Id., citing Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d at 151.
97
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 586 (footnotes omitted). In response to the university’s “plain language” argument that Section 501(c)(3)
was devoid of any “charitable” overlay to all of the purposes delineated therein, the Court stated:
It is a well-established cannon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal
language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute . . .
‘And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular
clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute …
and the objects and policy of the law….’
Id. In addition, the Court explained:
The Court's reading of § 501(c)(3) does not render meaningless Congress' action in specifying the
eight categories of presumptively exempt organizations, as petitioners suggest. . . . To be entitled
to tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), an organization must first fall within one of the categories
specified by Congress, and in addition must serve a valid charitable purpose.
Id. at 592, n.19.
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charitable purposes. The form of § 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell
us: in enacting both § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable
organizations, to encourage development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose
or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.”100 According, as set
forth previously in the discussion on the meaning of “charitable,” the Bob Jones University
decision solidified the view that there is a “charitable” overlay to all exempt organizations
described in Section 501(c)(3), thereby providing the means necessary to impose a public policy
limitation on all such exempt organizations.101
To support its conclusion that Bob Jones University violated an “established” public
policy and, thus, could not be considered charitable, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]n
unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this
Court’s view that racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public
policy, as well as rights of individuals.”102 In addition to Brown, the Court relied on the civil
rights acts passed by Congress as well as executive orders issued over a forty-year period to
conclude that eliminating racial discrimination in education and elsewhere was an established
national public policy.103 Accordingly, the Court relied on the aggregated pronouncements of all
three branches of government as constituting established public policy.
The Supreme Court rejected the university’s argument that the Treasury (IRS by
delegation) overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing the 1970 and 1971 rulings and notices,
noting that Treasury has consistently received “broad authority” from Congress to interpret tax

100

Id. at 587-588 (footnotes omitted). The Court proceeded to enunciate a fairly broad standard for tax exemption:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit--a
benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.
History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution
must fall within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the
common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be
conferred.
Id. at 591-592 (footnotes omitted).
101
Cf. Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints On Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291, 292 (1984)
(opining that the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob Jones Univ. “misread the common law of charity into the [Internal
Revenue] Code while confusing the public policy and public benefits strands of charitable trust law. . . . when read
properly trust law does not provide the theoretical foundation for public policy constraints in the area of federal tax
law.”).
As the lone dissenter in Bob Jones Univ., Justice Rehnquist rejected similarly the notion there existed a charitable
overlay to each of the delineated purposes in Section 501(c)(3). He concluded that “the legislative history of
§501(c)(3) unmistakably makes clear that Congress has decided what organizations are serving a public purpose and
providing a public benefit within the meaning of §501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in §501(c)(3) the characteristics
of such organizations.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 615. The Justice concludes by stating that he agrees with the
majority that there exists a “strong national policy in this country opposed to racial discrimination. I agree with the
Court that Congress has the power to further this policy by denying §501(c)(3) status to organizations that practice
racial discrimination. But as of yet Congress has failed to do so. Whatever the reasons for the failure, this Court
should not legislate for Congress.” Id. at 622 (footnotes omitted). See also Galvin & Devins, supra note 85, at
1363.
102
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
103
Id. at 593-595; see also Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 403-404.
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laws.104 Furthermore, the Court concluded that IRS’s primary responsibility, guided by the
Internal Revenue Code, is to determine whether an entity is “charitable” under Sections 170 and
501(c)(3), which also “may necessitate later determinations of whether given activities so violate
public policy that such an entity cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of
‘charitable’ status.”105 Finally, in response to the university’s argument that the public policy
doctrine violated their First Amendment free exercise rights, the Court affirmed that certain
compelling governmental interests can justify regulating certain religiously-based conduct.106 In
finding that the government’s interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education was
sufficiently compelling to overcome any First Amendment concerns, the Court concluded that
the “[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private
religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.”107
2.

Critique of the Public Policy Doctrine

Although considered to be the correct result, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones
University has nevertheless been deliberated and criticized extensively. The Supreme Court has
been disparaged for concluding that a charitable overlay to Section 501(c)(3) exists and imposing
a public policy limitation on the statute.108 The Court has likewise been rebuked for “abdicating
its supervisory powers to the IRS . . . and supplant[ing] the role of Congress as lawmaker by
making broad tax policy pronouncements,” rather than exercising the oversight necessary to
ensure that the IRS properly enforces the tax laws.109
The doctrine has also been criticized consistently as lacking legal or statutory authority
and a “clearly defined scope of applicability.”110 Since the IRS’s adoption of its racial
nondiscrimination policy in 1970, Congress has neither enacted any law that codifies the public
policy doctrine nor provided the IRS with “legal authority to act solely on public policy
grounds.”111 As a consequence, some scholars question whether the IRS is the appropriate
104

Id. at 596.
Id. at 597-598. See also Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 404-405, discussing legislative events
occurring after the IRS’s adoption of the public policy limitation in 1970, which made “an unusually strong case of
legislative acquiescence … and ratification” by Congress. Id.
106
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (Court held that
“neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit
children from dispensing religious literature.”).
107
Id. at 603-604. The Court further concluded that the government’s interest “substantially outweighs whatever
burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by
petitioners [the university] cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, . . . and no ‘less
restrictive means’ . . . are available to achieve the governmental interest.” Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
108
Galvin & Devins, supra note 85, at 1379-1380; see also Galston, supra note 101.
109
Id.
110
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 186. For his other scholarship on discrimination and tax-exempt
charities, see Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, and David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution:
Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law’s Public Policy Limitation for
Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779 (2002) [hereinafter, Brennen, Charities and the Constitution].
111
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 186-187, n.83; see also, Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra
note 26, at 446 (“Congress has passed no law that affirmatively states that the Treasury shall, pursuant to its own
determinations of ‘established public policy,’ grant or deny tax-exempt status based on race. Additionally, Congress
has not ratified, expressly or implicitly, the Court’s interpretation that the pubic policy power emanates from the
Treasury’s obligation to interpret the term ‘charitable’ in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.”). However, Congress did
105
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federal agency to determine if a charitable organization violates an established public policy.112
In his concurrence in Bob Jones University, Justice Powell appears to agree by asserting that this
task belongs to Congress:
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be little to
circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner [of Internal
Revenue]. This may be very well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand
of social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time . . . , but
application of our tax laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely,
social policy in the first instance is a matter for legislative concern.113
One scholar, Professor David Brennen, argues that this lack of IRS authority forced the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University to rely on an expansive interpretation of “charitable” in
Section 501(c)(3) as justification for the IRS’s public policy power.114 In disagreeing with such
an expansive view of “charitable,” Brennen concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision fails to
“address the limits of the Treasury’s ability to determine when or if a particular ‘public policy’ is
sufficiently ‘established’” in contexts other than racial discrimination.115 Accordingly, Brennen
raises a fundamental issue – which sources of law or current policy should the IRS consult to
determine that a national public policy exists? Federal constitutional law? Federal civil rights
laws? States’ laws?116 In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court looked to all three branches
of government to conclude an established public policy existed. Is this the proper standard to be
applied in all instances? As accentuated further by another legal scholar, “it may also be quite
validly asserted that there is a federal public policy, either presently in existence or in the process
of development, against other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of
enact Section §501(i) of the Code in 1976, which prohibits certain discrimination by social clubs. The statutory
language used in Section 501(i) limits its applicability to social clubs exempt from federal income tax under Section
501(c)(7); public charities exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) are not covered. I.R.C. §501(i)
(2006) provides:
[A]n organization which is described in [§501] (c)(7) [a social club] shall not be exempt from
taxation . . . for any taxable year if, at any time during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or
other governing instrument, of such organization, or any written policy statement of such
organization contains a provision which provides for discrimination against any person on the
basis of race, color or religion.
Justice Rehnquist referred to the existence of Section 501(i) in his Bob Jones Univ. dissent as evidence that if
Congress “wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is
fully aware of how to do it.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 621.
112
See Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 411-428.
113
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 611-12, quoting Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75
(1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Hatfield, Milgram & Monticciolo, Bob Jones Univ. University:
Defining Violations of Fundamental Public Policy, NYU TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY (2000), at 14, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/libframe.html (last visited Sep. 7, 2006); and Gavins & Devins, supra note 85, at 1373.
114
Id.
115
Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 26, at 407; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
116
Id. at 436-439. For instance, there is no established national public policy against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Although numerous municipalities and some states have enacted anti-discrimination ordinances
and laws, there is no established federal law specifically addressing this kind of discrimination. In deed, Congress’s
actions to date fail to “come within the standards envisioned by the Bob Jones Univ. Court for proving the existence
of a fundamental national public policy against sexual orientation discrimination.” Hatfield, et. al, supra note 113,
at 78, 86-87.
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marital status, national origin, religion, handicap, sexual preference, and age.”117 The lack of a
clearly defined source of public policy is only compounded by the significant evidentiary burden
placed on the IRS to determine and prove that an organization’s activities violate a fundamental
public policy.118
In conclusion, the absence of a clearly defined public policy results in the IRS balancing
its unfettered discretion in exercising public policy power with the heavy burden of proving that
a policy is established. This difficult balancing act may explain why the IRS has used the public
policy doctrine as the basis for revocation only in instances involving racial discrimination, civil
disobedience, or illegal activity.119 Furthermore, the lack of a defined public policy also leaves
charitable organizations in the precarious position of monitoring the current political climate to
ensure their activities do not violate a contemporary public policy.120 Although the codification
of the public policy doctrine has been proposed as a solution for its lack of legal or statutory
authority,121 it is the doctrine’s lack of defined scope and the difficulty balancing act imposed on
the IRS in applying the doctrine that prevent the doctrine from being more effective in
addressing discrimination by charities. As illustrated in Part I of this Article, reliance on the
doctrine to combat discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or even
religion has been futile since such bases are not “established” public policy. Only Congress’s
enactment of a well-defined nondiscrimination requirement in Section 501(c)(3) will effectively
cease discrimination by charitable organizations.
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E.

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE – A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
POLICY DOCTRINE’S SCOPE?

TO

CLARIFY

THE

PUBLIC

One scholar propounds that the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale122 “implicates fundamental aspects of true democracy” – the intersection of First
Amendment free expression rights with state and social goals to eradicate discrimination (i.e., via
anti-discrimination laws).123 Clearly, the First Amendment right to free expression prevailed.124
Although it is difficult to argue that the inherent weaknesses of the public policy doctrine
resulted in the Supreme Court’s Boy Scouts decision, it is certainly plausible to argue that the
decision only further exploited the doctrine’s weaknesses, ultimately leading to IRS inaction in
its wake. Because the public policy doctrine lacks a “clearly defined scope of applicability,”125
the Boy Scouts remains a charitable organization under Section 501(c)(3) despite its explicit and
unapologetic discrimination in excluding homosexual members. Although the Boy Scouts
decision did not involve federal income tax law ostensibly, in upholding the Boy Scouts’ ban on
homosexuals on the basis of their First Amendment right of expressive association, the decision
did resurrect the issue of what constitutes an “established” public policy and whether the Boy
Scouts’ discriminatory policy should preclude it from being described as charitable under
Section 501(c)(3).126 Accordingly, in the world of charitable organizations and tax-exempt law,
the Supreme Court’s Boy Scouts decision is more significant for what it did not address than for
what it did.
In the case, a local council of the Boy Scouts expelled James Dale, an assistant
scoutmaster, from its membership after he publicly declared his homosexuality.127 Dale filed
suit in the state superior court alleging the Boy Scouts’ violation of the New Jersey public
accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
places of public accommodation.128 The court’s Chancery Division granted summary judgment
in favor of the Boy Scouts, but was reversed by the Appellate Division.129 The New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that the Boy Scouts’ revocation of Dale’s membership violated the
state public accommodations law by revoking Dale’s membership based on his confirmed
homosexuality.130 The Court held that the application of the state law did not violate the Boy
Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association because members could still effect the
organization’s purposes with Dale as a member.131 The Court further concluded that the State
had a compelling interest in eradicating “the destructive consequences of discrimination from our
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society” and that its public accommodations law restrained no more speech than necessary to
accomplish its purpose.132
Adopting a divergent view, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the New
Jersey law violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association and upheld
the organization’s right to exclude homosexuals from its membership.133 The Supreme Court
began its opinion by referring to its prior decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees134 where
the Court discerned that “implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”135 The Court concluded
that this “right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would
rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”136 In its “limited” inquiry into the Boy Scouts’
viewpoints, the Supreme Court found that the organization’s foundation of encouraging its youth
membership to be “morally straight” and “clean” would be significantly burdened by Dale’s
presence, which would “promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”137
Thus, the notion that Dale’s very presence constitutes a message buttresses the Court’s
opinion.138 By finding that the Boy Scouts’ expression would be burdened by Dale’s compelled
membership, the Supreme Court summarily concluded that the New Jersey’s interests embodied
in its public accommodations law failed to justify such a “severe intrusion” on the Boy Scouts’
rights to freedom of expressive association.139
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Id. at 640, 647.
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In his spirited dissent,140 Justice Stevens was concerned that under the majority’s
standard, “the right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to exclude for every
organization, whether or not it engages in any expressive activities.”141 Relying on the Court’s
prior decision in Roberts, Justice Stevens concluded that the New Jersey law did not “impose any
serious burdens” on the Boy Scouts’ “collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals,” nor did it
compel the Boy Scouts to communicate any message that it did not wish to endorse.142
Similarly, Justice Souter contended in his dissent that the Court’s decision converts “the right of
expressive association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law.”143 While this Article
does not address the propriety of either the majority or the dissenting opinions in Boy Scouts with
respect to the constitutional right of a charitable organization to discriminate,144 this Article does
raise a fundamental issue not addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision – namely, whether a
charitable organization’s First Amendment right of expressive association might “trump” an IRS
determination that the organization no longer meets the definition of “charitable” under
Section 501(c)(3) due to its discriminatory practices.
To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether denying or revoking an
organization’s tax-exempt status based on its discriminatory membership policy or other
exclusionary practice violates that organization’s First Amendment right to expressive
140
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association.145 As discussed in Part IV of this Article, the Court has sustained limitations on
charitable organizations’ other First Amendment rights (i.e., free speech, free exercise of
religion) as a condition to exemption under Section 501(c)(3).146 Notwithstanding, it is
ambiguous whether the Court would similarly conclude, based on facts similar to those in Boy
Scouts, that an organization’s constitutional right to expressive association would not be
seriously constrained by a revocation or denial of its Section 501(c)(3) exemption.147 However,
it seems unambiguous, in light of the current administration and political climate, that any
governmental agency would argue that a compelling governmental interest to eradicate
discrimination based on sexual orientation currently exists. Since the public policy doctrine
lacks a clearly defined scope of applicability, such discrimination by charitable organizations is
effectively sanctioned by current income tax law and its primary enforcer, the IRS.
III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS COMBATING
DISCRIMINATION BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
This Article is not the first to address the issue of discrimination by charitable
organizations. Professor David Brennen is a pioneering scholar on the convergence of laws
addressing discrimination, primarily racial, and federal income tax law governing tax-exempt
organizations. Accordingly, he has analyzed and advocated potential solutions to the
discrimination problem. Each of these proposed solutions has its strengths and weaknesses, and,
therefore, provides valuable insights in formulating the proposal advocated in this Article.
Accordingly, this Article explores these proposed solutions in greater detail below.
A.

THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE – CLARIFICATION AND EXPANDED SCOPE?

As stated above, Professor Brennen has written extensively on the public policy doctrine
as announced in Bob Jones University, its inherent flaws, and the proper determination of its
applicability.148 Some of his criticisms were discussed and evaluated previously in Part II of this
Article.149 He ultimately concludes that the judicially-created public policy doctrine is not the
proper vehicle to combat racial discrimination and that the IRS is likely not the proper
administrative agency to interpret and enforce the public policy doctrine.150 In evaluating
options to better apply, and effect the purposes of, the public policy doctrine, he suggests
codification of the doctrine, thereby providing the necessary statutory authority for its effective
application to charitable organizations.151 He also advocates Congressional authorization of a
federal agency other than the Treasury (i.e., IRS by delegation) to “review and rule upon
complaints of discrimination by tax-exempt charities,” arguing that other agencies are better
equipped at addressing such issues.152 Finally, in exploring the role of constitutional law
145
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principles in establishing the doctrine’s scope, Professor Brennen concludes that that the IRS’s
almost exclusive reliance on constitutional law principles in determining the boundaries of
“established public policy” is inappropriate.153 While observing that the public policy doctrine
originates in the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., Section 501(c)(3)) and is therefore a statutory, not
constitutional, principle, he illustrates that in most instances charities are private, not state, actors
and, thus, are generally not subject to constitutional law limitations such as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 Professor Brennen ultimately concludes that the IRS
should “engage in a type of analysis that considers a variety of sources constitutional, nonconstitutional, federal and non-federal – in deciding if a particular charity is in violation of
‘established public policy.’”155
Principally, this Article concurs with Professor Brennen’s critique of the public policy
doctrine and how the doctrine’s inherent flaws prevent its from combating effectively most
discrimination by charitable organizations. However, none of the proposed fixes appears to
address adequately the doctrine’s flaws. While the doctrine has been effective in eradicating
racial discrimination in education, its lack of a clearly defined source of “established public
policy” as well as the significant evidentiary burden placed on the IRS to determine and prove
that an organization’s principles violate a fundamental public policy have rendered the doctrine
woefully inadequate in combating other forms of discrimination. As previously illustrated in
Part I of this Article, reliance on the doctrine to combat discrimination on the basis of marital
status or sexual orientation is nonexistent and futile since such discrimination does not violate
any “established” public policy. Although the existence of a national public policy against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has been posited,156 the current administration
and political climate clearly refute such a conclusion. Therein lies another fatal flaw of the
doctrine – its potential exposure to the whims of current political climate due mostly to its lack
of a clearly defined source of established public policy.157 Despite these exposed flaws and
extensive criticism by legal scholars, Congress has failed to step up and statutorily fix the
doctrine’s deficiencies. Accordingly, the public policy doctrine is clearly not the best solution to
combat effectively the continued problem of discrimination by charitable organizations.
B.

EXPANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS’ APPLICABILITY TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
1.

Overview

In addition to his scholarship evaluating the public policy doctrine, Professor Brennen
has also explored the expansion of the civil rights laws’ scope as a means to combat
discrimination by charitable organizations.158 Although this expansion approach, outlined
below, possesses more potential than any proposed fix to the public policy doctrine, it still fails
to provide a comprehensive solution to the kinds of discrimination illustrated in this Article.
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Although federal protection of an individual citizen’s civil rights are contained in a
“framework of laws consisting of the Constitution, statutes, regulations, executive actions, and
court interpretation,” these laws do not apply comprehensively to any potential violator of such
rights.159 For instance, civil rights protection afforded by the Constitution does not apply
normally unless the violator is a “state actor,” of which most charitable organizations are not.160
Accordingly, charitable organizations are free to discriminate on any basis without penalty
unless they are subject to certain “federal statutes that impose civil rights restrictions on private,
nonstate actors.”161 Such applicable federal statutes currently forbid discrimination based on
race, gender, disability and age in programs and activities that receive “federal financial
assistance” (hereinafter, “FFA”).162
The enforcement mechanism with respect to such statutes’ nondiscrimination
requirements is contained directly in the statute, compelling the awarding governmental agency
to promulgate regulations that effect the statute’s objectives.163 In addition to being defined
statutorily as a “grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty,”164 FFA
has also been judicially interpreted in the context of these civil rights laws.165 Essentially, FFA
159
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constitutes “funds received directly or indirectly from the federal government.”166 Thus,
charitable organizations that receive direct assistance from the federal government in the form of
grants or loans or that receive fees from direct recipients of FFA are required to comply with
these civil rights’ laws.167 To address the large number of charitable organizations which do not
fall into either of these situations, Professor Brennen embarks down the arduous path of
determining whether such organizations may be deemed to receive FFA in the form of certain
tax benefits; principally, the income tax exemption for charitable organizations and the income
tax deduction for persons making contributions to such organizations.168 In making this
determination, he analyzes the two federal district court opinions that reached opposite
conclusions as to whether tax exemption constitutes FFA.169
In McGlotten v. Connally,170 the federal district court determined that certain federal tax
benefits constitute FFA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff in
McGlotten filed suit to enjoin the IRS from granting exemptions to nonprofit social clubs and
fraternal organizations that excluded non-white persons from their membership.171 In responding
to the plaintiff’s three separate counts for relief,172 the McGlotten court specifically addresses
whether various tax benefits, mainly in the form of an exemption and a deduction for
contributions, granted to certain nonprofit organizations constitute FFA under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.173 The court ultimately concluded that the tax benefits granted to
fraternal organizations (i.e., tax exemption and deduction for certain contributions to the
organization) did constitute FFA under Title VI.174 In the absence of convincing legislative
history, the court relied on the “plain purpose” of Title VI in reaching its conclusion – “clearly to
eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefiting from federal financial assistance.”175

459 (1999) (even though its college and university members received FFA, NCAA’s receipt of dues from such
institutions did not constitute FFA); and Richard Foss v. Chicago, 817 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (even though City of
Chicago received federal funding, the City’s Fire Department not considered a recipient of FFA).
166
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 171.
167
Id. at 171-172; see also Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 563.
168
I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006) and I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006), respectively.
169
Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 172, 200-207.
170
McGlotten v. Connally 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
171
Id. Nonprofit social clubs are exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(7), which describes such clubs as
ones “organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006). Fraternal
organizations are exempt under § 501(c)(8) , which describes such organizations as “operating under the lodge
system or for the exclusive benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under a lodge system, and
providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of such society, order, or
association or their dependents.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(8) (2006). I.R.C. § 170(c)(4) authorizes a deduction for certain
contributions to fraternal organizations (i.e., contributions “used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary or education purposes . . .”).
172
The three separate counts of relief sought by plaintiff are: (i) the Internal Revenue Code’s grant of certain tax
benefits is unconstitutional; (ii) such benefits are not authorized by the Code, and (iii) such tax benefits constitute
FFA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 450.
173
McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 450.
174
Id. at 461-62.
175
Id. at 461.

-25-

However, the McGlotten court determined that the exemption granted to nonprofit social
clubs under Section 501(c)(7) did not constitute FFA.176 The court reasoned that such exemption
“limited as it is to member-generated funds and available regardless of the nature of the activity
of the particular club, does not operate as a ‘grant’ of Federal funds,” and thus was not covered
by Title VI.177 Essentially, Congress determined, according to the court, that member-generated
funds should not be taxed in that they are merely “shifted from one pocket to another, both
within the same pair of pants. Thus the exclusion of member generated revenue reflects a
determination that as to these funds the organization does not operate as a separate entity.”178 In
other words, as to such funds, social clubs are deemed to not function as entities separate and
apart from their members.179 Finally, the court reasoned that since exemption under
Section 501(c)(7) was granted to a club regardless of its activities, “there is no mark of
Government approval inherent in the designation of a group as exempt. Congress has simply
chosen not to tax a particular type of revenue because it is not within the scope [of income]
sought to be taxed by the statute.”180 An opposite conclusion was reached by the court with
respect to fraternal organizations because their tax exemption “operates in fact as a subsidy in
favor of the particular activities these groups are pursuing,”181 and was not “simply a way of
defining taxable income.”182 In conclusion, as Brennen points out, under McGlotten, a tax
benefit will likely constitute FFA if Congress intended the benefit to constitute more than an
“income-defining provision” and if the grant of the benefit is conditional on the benefiting
organization limiting its activities to certain “government-specified purposes.”183
Contrary to McGlotten , the federal district court in Bachmann v. American Society of
Clinical Pathologists184 concluded that tax exemption by itself does not constitute FFA for
purposes of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.185 In Bachmann, the plaintiff sued the
American Society of Clinical Pathologists ("ASCP") for ASCP's denial of her request for special
testing conditions during an examination conducted by ASCP, alleging that such denial
constituted discrimination against a handicapped person in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.186
Although ASCP received no direct funding from the federal government, plaintiff contended that
it received “indirect financial assistance” in form of its tax-exempt status.187 The court stated
that, “[a]lthough tax exempt status confers a substantial economic advantage on ASCP, not every
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item of economic value granted by the federal government counts as financial assistance within
the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”188 Relying on the “plain meaning” of
section 504, the court concluded that “the term ‘assistance’ connotes a transfer of government
funds by way of subsidy, not merely an exemption from taxation.”189 In addition to relying on
administrative regulations that did not include tax-exemption as constituting FFA, the court
found persuasive a the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell190 where Title IX
was deemed applicable based on the educational institution’s receipt of federal grants and
student loans, not its tax exempt status.191
Because Professor Brennen is advocating for a more expansive application of the civil
rights laws to charitable organizations, he concludes accordingly that the broader judicial
interpretations of FFA in Grove City College and McGlotten are “the preferred method of
interpretation in terms of maximizing protections to those persons whose federal civil rights are
violated.”192 By instituting this broader interpretation, Brennen argues that parties to a civil
rights suit will expend more time on determining whether discrimination has occurred rather than
whether the correct form of government assistance was received in order for the civil rights law
to apply.193 Notwithstanding the social justice implications of a broader view of FFA, Brennen
acknowledges that the lack of a Supreme decision specifying that certain tax benefits constitute
FFA allows courts to interpret the term narrowly and decline to impose civil rights constraints on
“nontraditional defendants,” as the Bachman decision illustrates.194 If the tax benefit received by
the defendant organization in Bachman was in the form of a government grant or loan, concludes
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Brennen, the plaintiff would have likely succeeded in her argument that the Rehabilitation Act
applied.195
Other than its general interpretation of FFA under the civil rights’ laws, the United States
Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether certain tax benefits like tax-exemption
constitute FFA.196 However, as Professor Brennen points out, the Court has concentrated on the
related issue of whether certain tax benefits should be considered government expenditures or
government neutrality for constitutional law purposes – the well-known “tax expenditure” theory
or conundrum in federal income tax law.197 Although the propriety of the tax expenditure theory
is well beyond the scope of this Article, a brief explanation and illustration of the concept is
necessary to fully comprehend Professor Brennen’s conclusion with respect to the expanded
applicability of the civil rights laws to charitable organizations.
The primary question that drives the tax expenditure theory is whether the receipt of a tax
benefit (e.g., deduction, exclusion, exemption) should be legally regarded as equivalent to a
direct government grant of money.198 To illustrate, if an organization is deemed to qualify for
tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3), should that organization be viewed, for legal
purposes, as receiving a direct government grant of money (i.e., in the form of forgone income
taxes)? Under the tax expenditure theory, the organization’s exemption is deemed equivalent to
a direct government outlay of cash.199 A similar analysis could be employed with respect to the
charitable contribution deduction – the tax expenditure theory treats the amount of the deduction
as equivalent to a direct government grant of money to the taxpayer claiming the deduction.200
Such equivalency under the tax expenditure theory “applies only to tax benefits enacted to
implement social policy – not those intended as a further delineation of the appropriate tax
base.”201 For instance, tax benefits received by a social club exempt under Section 501(c)(7) (as
in the McGlotten case) would not be equated with a government grant or loan since the club’s
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exemption is not intended to effect any social policy, but simply defining taxable income.202
Accordingly, under the tax expenditure theory, a tax benefit or expenditure that accomplishes a
social purpose and a direct government outlay for the identical purpose are equivalent, both
economically and for constitutional law purposes.203
Although Brennen primarily accepts the economic equivalence concept contained in the
tax expenditure theory to support his thesis, he appears to join other scholars in limiting its
impact in the constitutional law context.204 He contends that economic equivalence for purposes
of interpreting and applying federal civil rights laws differs from applying such equivalence in a
case involving constitutional law.205 For example, government or state involvement is crucial in
determining whether a First Amendment violation occurs due to government funding. However,
such involvement is less critical in applying federal civil rights laws where the existence of
government funding to a private individual or entity is significant as well as “whether Congress
intended that the financial benefit support the private party’s activities.”206 Professor Brennen
ultimately concludes that “tax expenditure theory can and should be used to equate tax benefits
received by charities with government grants and loans received by various private parties.”207
In other words, a charitable organization’s income tax exemption should be treated as FFA for
purposes of subjecting that organization to federal civil rights laws.
2.

Critique of the Civil Rights Laws’ Expansion Proposal

Again, this Article principally agrees with Professor Brennen’s approach with respect to
charitable organizations and discrimination – “Discriminate if you choose, but not with federal
subsidies.”208 While the persuasiveness and viability of Professor Brennen’s civil rights laws’
expansion proposal are undeniable, the proposal’s very weakness is its reliance on such laws to
202
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combat the kind of ongoing discrimination by charitable organizations illustrated in Part I of this
Article. First and foremost, current civil rights laws are limited in their application, protecting
against discrimination on the basis of race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, sex or
gender, age, and disability.209 They do not prohibit discrimination on the bases of sexual
orientation or marital status,210 both of which appear to be the most common instances of
discrimination currently engaged in by charitable organizations.211 Brennen even refers to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as “harmful discriminatory behavior” by
charitable organizations,212 but fails to further explain how his proposal to expand the application
of civil rights laws as currently written will combat such harmful discrimination. An additional
hurdle created by Professor Brennen’s proposal is its reliance on a more expansive interpretation
of FFA. Although this Article agrees with Professor Brennen’s conclusion that FFA should
include such tax benefits as exemption and deductibility of contributions by donors to the
organization, the Supreme Court has not made such a determination and lower courts are not in
agreement, as illustrated by the decisions in McGlotten and Bachman.213 Until the Supreme
Court addresses this issue directly, the use of civil rights laws to combat the discrimination
problem fails to comprehensively address the problem. Furthermore, as with all issues involving
statutory interpretation, it can be argued that if Congress intended to extend the
nondiscrimination provisions in the civil rights’ laws specifically to charitable organizations it
could have done so by including specific language in the statutes or by directing the
promulgation of administrative regulations.214 As stated by the Second Circuit in a case
attempting to expand civil rights protection granted by Title VII, Congressional inaction can be
“strong evidence of congressional intent.”215
Despite the merits of Professor Brennen’s proposal, which was published over six years
ago, it unfortunately does not reflect current reality. Even if courts interpreted FFA broadly
enough to encompass tax benefits such as exemption and the charitable contributions deduction,
current civil rights laws would not prohibit charitable organizations from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation and marital status. To truly accomplish Professor Brennen’s goal of
combating all discrimination by charitable organizations, current civil rights laws would need to
be amended and expanded to prohibit discrimination on such bases. For such statutory
209
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amendments to occur, Congressional intent must exist to prohibit such discrimination by private
actors other than just charitable organizations – for example, the business community. The
existence of such intent is dubious at best. Nevertheless, as proposed below, a more tailored
legislative fix could prove more effective in preventing federal public monies (i.e., tax benefits)
from being utilized by charitable organizations to discriminate against any class of citizens.
IV. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 501(c)(3) TO ESTABLISH
A NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT FOR TAX EXEMPTION
Part I of this Article illustrates the ostensibly common practice of discrimination by
charitable organizations.216 As discussed in Part II, federal income tax law with respect to
charitable organizations does not explicitly address nor proscribe discrimination by such
organizations.217 The only possible restraint on discrimination exists in the public policy
doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University. However, as discussed
previously, the public policy doctrine is fraught with limitations, including the lack of a clearly
defined source of “established public policy.”218 As a consequence, the doctrine has only been
used as the basis to deny or revoke tax-exempt status of organizations that participated in racial
discrimination, advocated civil disobedience, or involved themselves in an illegal activity.219 As
further illustrated in Part III of this Article, current civil rights’ laws are limited in their
application and do not prohibit currently the most common bases of discrimination by charitable
organizations – sexual orientation and marital status. In addition, even if certain discrimination
is covered by the civil rights’ laws, such laws do not apply to a charitable organization unless it
receives FFA.220 The issue of whether FFA should be confined narrowly to a direct government
grant or loan or include such “indirect” benefits as tax exemption and the charitable contributions
deduction is not resolved definitively.221 Accordingly, the existing deficiencies in current federal
law effectively sanction most discrimination by charitable organizations.
A.

THE PROPOSAL

In light of the above, this Article propounds that the most effective and comprehensive
solution to eliminate discrimination by charitable organizations is the enactment of a broad and
well-defined nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3). As stated in this Article’s
introduction, inherent in this proposal is the notion that discrimination by a charitable
organization in any circumstance (employment, provision of services, etc.) is intrinsically
incompatible with the organization’s charitable purpose and mission. This nondiscrimination
provision should be based on currently existing language in the civil rights’ laws referenced in
Part III but expanded to reflect the bases on which charitable organizations are most commonly
discriminating – sexual orientation and marital status. Because it is contained in a federal
income tax exemption statute, Congress may be more open to such an expanded prohibition
216
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since its applicability is limited to nonprofit organizations exempt from federal income tax and
not to for-profit, private actors like businesses. This proposal can be instituted by adding a
subparagraph to Section 501(c)(3) similar to the following:
(A)
No organization described under subsection (c)(3) shall exclude from
participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject to discrimination in, any of its
programs or activities, including its employment practices, any person in the
United States on the basis of race, color, national or ethnic origin, sex or gender,
age, handicap, disability, religion, marital status, or sexual orientation.222
Many reasons support the proposal set forth above. By not relying on an ill-defined
public policy doctrine or civil rights’ laws that are questionably applicable, a nondiscrimination
requirement in Section 501(c)(3) offers a more comprehensive solution to the problem presented
in this Article. Furthermore, by imposing the requirement directly in the statute that grants taxexempt status, a strong and symbolic message is being sent to both potential and existing
charitable organizations that discriminatory policies and practices are fundamentally inconsistent
with tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3). Instead, nondiscriminatory practices and
policies comport with the commonly accepted notion of being “charitable” and conferring public
More importantly, a statutory prohibition on discrimination transforms
benefit.223
Section 501(c)(3) into the “gold standard” for all organizations exempt from federal income tax
under Section 501(a).224 Since a corresponding benefit of being exempt under Section 501(c)(3)
is the ability to provide donors a charitable contributions deduction under Section 170,225 such
transformation ensures that charities’ beneficiaries are as diverse and all encompassing as the
taxpaying public from whom such organizations draw their support. In other words, the flow of
tax-deductible dollars generated by the Section 170 deduction should not be used to discriminate
against a particular segment of society since the significant cost of providing such tax benefit (an
estimated $232 billion over the next five years) is bore by all taxpayers.226
In line with the above arguments, the granting of a tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3)
to an organization can be viewed as resulting in a “social contract” between the organization, the
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government and taxpayers.227 Although not proposed as constituting a legally enforceable
obligation,228 this social contract concept suggests that there are certain purposes and activities
that society attributes to an organization with “charitable” tax-exempt status under
Section 501(c)(3). In contrast, certain actions, such as discrimination, do not comport with
society’s notion of what constitutes a charity and, thus, violate or undermine this social contract.
A charitable organization’s violation of this social contract will likely cause a shift in the
public’s perception and support, with unfavorable results to the organization. This is best
illustrated by the adverse impact that negative publicity can have on a charitable organization’s
receipt of donations and other financial support. For instance, both the United Way of the
National Capital Area, in response to its publicized financial scandal, and the Boy Scouts of
America, as a result of its exposed ban on homosexual members, suffered such adverse financial
impact.229 Finally, to further bolster the notion of a social contract, the Supreme Court alluded to
the existence of such a contract in explaining its expansive view of “charitable” (i.e., that a
charitable overlay to Section 501(c)(3) exists) in Bob Jones University:
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are
affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that
other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious "donors." Charitable
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public
benefit--a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be
able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public
institutions already supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make
clear that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within
a category specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds
227
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with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that
might otherwise be conferred.230
In setting forth its proposal, this Article embraces this social contract premise and affirms that
discrimination of the kind illustrated in Part I is at odds with the common community conscience
and the notion of what constitutes a charity and, therefore, undermines any public benefit that
such charities otherwise confer. Accordingly, in light of such discriminatory practices or
policies, such charities should no longer be considered “charitable” and, thus, tax-exempt under
Section 501(c)(3).
In addition to the difficulties discussed below,231 another possible effect of this Article’s
proposal may be a reduction in the number of organizations that qualify for exempt status under
Section 501(c)(3). However, such a reduced eligibility for Section 501(c)(3) exempt status is
neither a novel nor an exceedingly unpopular notion. With approximately 1.1 million
organizations currently exempt under Section 501(c)(3) (including over 63,400 organizations
added in fiscal year 2005)232 whose assets exceed $1.9 trillion,233 many commentators have
propounded alternatives to the current tax-exemption scheme that could effectively limit the
number of charitable organizations.234 As stated by one such commentator with respect to his
proposal that rethinks the current exemption scheme, “[s]uch a position, of course, would cut a
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very wide swath through current exempt organizations . . . but it would end the current
uncertainty. . . .”235
Ultimately, if an organization’s exemption under Section 501(c)(3) is denied or revoked
due to a nondiscrimination requirement, that organization may still qualify for exempt status
under Section 501(c)(4) as a “social welfare” organization.236 However, donations to social
welfare organizations do not qualify for the charitable contribution deduction under
Section 170(a).237 Nevertheless, such lack of deductibility accomplishes one of the core themes
to the proposal set forth herein – the stream of tax-deductible dollars received by charitable
organizations should not be used to discriminate against any member of society.
B.

DIFFICULTIES AND POTENTIAL CRITICISMS

The proposed inclusion of a nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) is
not intended to end all necessary discussion on the real problem of discrimination by charitable
organizations. Rather, the proposal set forth herein is intended to raise awareness to the problem
and to provide a solution that is more comprehensive than federal law currently provides. As
with all new legal foundations, there are difficulties in applying this nondiscrimination
requirement to the tax-exempt organization community as it is currently structured. This Article
attempts to confront some of those difficulties and likely criticisms below while acknowledging
that many potential issues are beyond its scope and will require further discussion.
1.

Constitutionality Issues

One of the major criticisms of the proposal set forth in this Article will likely mirror those
lobbied against the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America;238
namely, that a broad, nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) violates an
organization’s First Amendment rights to free speech, religious expression, and association,
among others.239 In other words, the imposition of such a nondiscrimination requirement would
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Colombo, supra note 234, at 386.
Section 501(c)(4) grants tax-exempt status to “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of
which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings
of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
However, there may be an argument that discriminatory policies or practices conflict with the regulatory definition
of social welfare, which provides that, “[a]n organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare
if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the
community. An organization embraced within this section is one which is operated primarily for the purpose of
bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in
1990) (emphasis added).
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See supra note 40.
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Dale, 734 A.2d at 1196.
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See Roy Whitehead, Jr. and Walter Block, The Boy Scouts, Freedom of Association, and the Right to
Discriminate: A Legal, Philosophical, and Economic Analysis, 29 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 851 (2004). Although the
article does not address tax exemption issues, it vehemently argues that “[f]reedom of association is a necessary
condition of a civilized order; laws prohibiting discrimination violate this freedom and must be repealed. All of
them.” Id. at 882. See also Erez Reuveni, On Boy Scouts and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Associational Rights
of Quasi-Religious Organizations, 86 B.U. L. REV. 109, 113 (2006) (contends that “quasi-religious” organizations
like the Boy Scouts deserve “greater associational protections” than purely secular organizations under the First
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violate the First Amendment because it “would significantly affect . . . [an organization’s] ability
to advocate public or private viewpoints.”240 As previously discussed in Part II of this Article,
the Supreme Court has not addressed whether denying or revoking an organization’s tax-exempt
status based on a discriminatory policies or practices violates that organization’s First
Amendment right.241 However, the Supreme Court has sustained other restrictions on charitable
organizations’ activities as a condition to exemption under Section 501(c)(3), dismissing any
claim that such restrictions violated the organization’s First Amendment rights. In reviewing one
such decision below, it is important to note that that tax exemption is typically viewed as a
Congressional grant or gift, not a constitutional right or privilege.242
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,243 a nonprofit organization was
organized to promote what it perceived to be the “public interest” in the area of federal
taxation.244
Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR) was formed in a
reorganization involving two other non-profit corporations, one of which was exempt under
Section 501(c)(3) and the other of which was exempt under Section 501(c)(4) due to its lobbying
activities. In denying TWR’s application for exemption under Section 501(c)(3), the IRS
determined that a substantial part of TWR’s activities would consist of attempting to influence
legislation in violation of the “no substantial part” limitation on lobbying activities contained in
Section 501(c)(3).245 In addressing TWR’s argument that such lobbying limitation violated its
First Amendment rights,246 the Supreme Court first explained that “[b]oth tax exemptions and
tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system,” analogizing

Amendment; specifically, courts should acknowledge such organizations’ religious character to “better effectuate
the underlying purposes of the [First Amendment’s] religion clauses.”), Christopher Ramey, Revealing the
Inadequacy of AB17: How Dictating Moraility Upon Faith-Based Organizations Will Wreak Havoc on California’s
Economy, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125 (2003) (rejects California’s then-proposed legislation AB17 (requires,
beginning in 2007, employers with state contracts valued at $100,000 or more to provide the same benefits to
spouses and domestic partners of employees) as imposing on the moral convictions of faith-based organizations that
contract with the State), and Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001).
240
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650.
241
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
242
See Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972) (“In light of the fact that
tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations contained in
Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from nonprofit corporations do not deprive Christian Echoes of its
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.”) (emphasis added).
243
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
244
Id. at 540.
245
Section 501(c)(3) provides that “no substantial part of the activities of . . . [the organization] is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h) ), . . .”
I.R.C. 501(c)(3) (2006).
246
The Supreme Court also dismisses TWR’s argument that the lobbying limitation within Section 501(c)(3)
violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, finding that its was rational
for Congress to decide that it would subsidize lobbying by veteran’s organizations even though it would not
subsidize substantial lobbying by other charities. Regan, 461 U.S. at 541. The Court explained that veterans have
“been obliged to drop their own affairs and take up the burdens of the nation,” and that the U.S. has a long tradition
of “compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages,” which has
been deemed legitimate. Id. at 551-552.
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such benefits to cash grants to the organization.247 The Court further clarified that “Congress
chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose not to subsidize other activities that
non profit organizations undertake to promote the public welfare.”248
Although it agreed with TWR’s assertion that “the government may not deny a benefit to
a person because he exercises a constitutional right,” the Court countered by stating that the
Internal Revenue Code does not restrict TWR’s ability to receive deductible contributions in
support of its non-lobbying activities.249 Rather, “Congress has merely refused to pay for
lobbying out of public monies.”250 To support its conclusion, the Court cited its prior decision in
Cammarano v. United States,251 which involved a Treasury Regulation that forbade business
deductions for lobbying expenses, where it determined similarly that “Congress is not required
by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying.”252 In Cammarano, the Supreme Court further
rejected the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are
subsidized by the State.”253
Of particular importance, the Court reminded TWR that it still qualified for exemption
under Section 501(c)(4) as a social welfare organization and could obtain deductible
contributions for its non-lobbying activities by returning to the dual structure from which it
originated (i.e., an entity exempt under Section 501(c)(3) for non-lobbying activities and a
related entity exempt under Section 501(c)(4) that performed a lobbying function).254 However,
the Court did caution that TWR needed to ensure that the charitable organization did not
subsidize the Section 501(c)(4) entity, “otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity
Congress chose not to subsidize.”255
247

Id. at 544. The Court explained that “[a] tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deduction contributions are similar to cash
grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions.” Id.
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Id. at 544.
249
Id. at 545.
250
Id.; see also Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857 (“The Congressional purposes evidenced by the 1934 [lobbying
limitation] and 1954 [political campaign prohibition] amendments are clearly constitutionally justified in keeping
with the separation and neutrality principles particularly applicable in this case and, more succinctly, the principle
that government shall not subsidize, directly or indirectly, those organizations whose substantial activities are
directed toward the accomplishment of legislative goals or the election or defeat of particular candidates.”).
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Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
252
Id. at 513. In Cammarano, the Court further rejected TWR’s reliance on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), which involved a California rule which required any taxpayer seeking a property tax exemption “to sign a
declaration stating that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government of the U.S..” The Supreme
Court stated in that case that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in speech is in effect to penalize
them for the same speech.” Id. at 518.
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Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857 (“The taxpayer [charitable
organization] may engage in all such activities [lobbying and political campaign intervention] without restraint,
subject, however, to withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from such
activities and obtain the privilege of exemption. The parallel to the ‘Hatch Act’ prohibitions relating to political
activities on the part of certain federal and state employees is clear: The taxpayer may opt to enter an area of federal
employment subject to the restraints and limitations upon his First Amendment rights. Conversely, he may opt not to
receive employment funds at the public trough in the areas covered by the restraints and thus exercise his First
Amendment rights unfettered.”).
254
Regan, 461 U.S. at 552-53.
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Id. at 544. To do so, the two entities should be separately incorporated and maintain records “adequate to show
that tax deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying.” Id. at n.6.
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In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun reminded the Court that “§ 501(c)(3) organizations
retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the government” and agreed with the
majority that a Section 501(c)(3) organization’s free speech rights are preserved “because it is
free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax
benefits for its non-lobbying activities.”256 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun still cautioned:
Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise over the
lobbying of their 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be
insurmountable. It hardly answers one person’s objection to a restriction on his
speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Similarly, an
attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on behalf of
their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations’ inability to
make known their views on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional
penalty. Such refusals would extend far beyond Congress’ mere refusal to
subsidize lobbying.257
The practical lesson to take away from the Supreme Court’s decision in Regan v.
Taxation With Representation is that Section 501(c)(4) provides a constitutional safety hatch
when imposing restrictions on the activities and possible constitutional rights of charitable
organizations.258 Less then two decades after the above Supreme Court decision, the D.C.
Circuit adopts this very approach in addressing a controversy involving a church that violated the
absolute prohibition on engaging in political activities contained in Section 501(c)(3).259 In
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,260 the plaintiff, doing business as the Church at Pierce Creek, a
tax-exempt church (“CPC”), placed a full-age advertisement in two newspaper four days before
the 1992 presidential election. The advertisements urged Christians not to vote for thencandidate Bill Clinton due to his “positions on certain moral issues.”261 Each advertisement
stated that it was co-sponsored by CPC and solicited tax-deductible donations in support of its
cause.262 In response, the IRS invoked a church tax inquiry followed by a church tax
examination, as statutorily prescribed.263 Ultimately concluding that the placement of the
advertisements violated the statutory prohibition on political campaign activity, the IRS revoked
256

Id. at 553.
Id.
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Even Professor Brennen acknowledges that his proposal – expanding applicability of federal civil rights laws to
charitable organizations – was not intended to apply to tax benefits granted to “noncharities” (e.g., business leagues
exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)), because such charities “are tax-exempt because they are inappropriate objects of
taxation and, hence, are not exempt for social policy reasons. Accordingly, these noncharitable mutual benefit
organizations that are exempt from income tax do not receive the type of tax benefit that, under tax expenditure
theory, is equivalent to a direct grant of government funds.” Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 26, at 225-26.
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Section 501(c)(3) provides that an organization can be exempt thereunder provided that it “does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
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260
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CPC’s tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3).264 CPC challenged the revocation, purporting
that it violated its free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.265
In response to CPC’s free exercise claim, the D.C. Circuit found that CPC failed to
establish that its free exercise rights had been substantially burdened and that the governmental
lacked a compelling interest justifying such burden.266 The court further concluded that CPC’s
loss of a “conditional privilege for failure to meet the condition” (i.e., loss of its exemption for
failing to meet the political campaign prohibition) did not constitute an unconstitutional burden
on its free exercise right. This would only be true, explained the court, “if the receipt of the
privilege (in this case the tax exemption) is condition ‘upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith, or … denie[d] … because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”267 The
court concluded the only effect of the revocation will be a “decrease in the amount of money
available to the Church for its religious practices. . . . such a burden ‘is not constitutionally
significant.’”268 Furthermore, the court found that CPC’s alleged burden was “overstated” since
churches receive “unique treatment” under the Internal Revenue Code, thereby rendering the
revocation’s impact “more symbolic than substantial.”269
In citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that “an alternate means of communication” was available to CPC in the
formation and operation of an affiliated organization exempt under Section 501(c)(4).270 The
court explained that while Section 501(c)(4) organizations are subject to a similar ban on
political campaign activities, such organizations may form a political action committee that can
participate in political campaigns without limitation.271 However, the court reminded CPC that it
could not channel its tax-deductible contributions to fund the political action committee, since
Congress has chosen not to subsidize such First Amendment activities.272
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Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140.
Id. 140-141.
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As in Regan, where the availability of a Section 501(c)(4) organization as an alternate
means of communication was deemed “essential to the constitutionality of section 501(c)(3)’s
restrictions on lobbying,”273 such availability was likewise essential in Branch Ministries to
sustain the constitutionality of Section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on political campaign activities.
Accordingly, it seems probable that the availability of such an alternate means of communication
might be of similar utility in sustaining the constitutionality of a nondiscrimination requirement
within Section 501(c)(3).
2.

Negative Impact on Pluralism

A corresponding criticism to the constitutionality issue is the contention that a
nondiscrimination requirement in Section 501(c)(3) effectively stifles open and diverse dialogue
on controversial topics like sexual orientation. Specifically, such a requirement will squelch the
“pluralism” implicit in the existence and purposes of the nonprofit sector. The Boy Scouts
argued similarly in their brief that “American pluralism thrives on difference” and that
“controversial questions of personal morality, often involving religious conviction, are best
tested and resolved within the private marketplace of ideas, and not as the subject of
government-imposed orthodoxy.”274 Acknowledging the values of pluralism and “autonomy of
diverse groups,” one scholar responded poignantly to that argument:
But it doesn’t follow that these values should always take priority over the effort
to break up entrenched patterns of discrimination and include, in socially valued
activities, people who have traditionally been outcasts.
The harms of
discrimination are particularly acute for children; gay youth suffer severe
developmental harm when forced to lie and hide their identities, which is
precisely what the Boy Scouts’ policy requires of the millions of gay adolescents
who discover their sexuality when they are already members. The prevention of
such harm is not a trivial state interest.275
Furthermore, as established above in the discussion on the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Regan and Branch Ministries, a charitable organization’s free speech rights are preserved
through its ability to form and effectively control a Section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization,
which would not be subject to a nondiscrimination requirement.276
Regardless of which side one takes on this provocative issue of pluralism, the more
pertinent question from a tax-exempt law point of view remains whether the stream of taxdeductible dollars received by charitable organizations should be used to achieve that pluralism
at the cost of discriminating against a particular segment of society. As stated above, this Article
contends that only organizations that do not discriminate should be granted the “gold standard”
of tax-exempt status – exemption under Section 501(c)(3). Despite its elimination of
273
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Koppelman, supra note 138, at 1835, citing Brief for Petitioner at 45 and 47, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
275
Koppelman, supra note 138, at 1835-36 (citations omitted).
276
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.

-40-

discriminatory policies and practices, the proposal set forth herein does not completely thwart
pluralism. Rather, to truly effect it, organizations with discriminatory policies or practices can
thrive in tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(4) or some other applicable subsection of
Section 501(c), with the only cost being incurred by their members and supporters who are
denied a Section 170 deduction for the dollars they contribute in support of such discrimination.
3.

Applicability to Religious Organizations

One of the more perplexing issues raised by the proposal set forth in this Article is how
best to apply it to religious organizations. This issue is especially pertinent in that most of the
instances of alleged or actual discrimination illustrated in Part I of this Article involve churchaffiliated or owned schools, universities, and service providers (e.g., children’s home).277 Before
discussing how best to address this difficult issue, a brief overview of the exemption of religious
organizations, including churches, is necessary.
a.

Overview of the Religious Exemption

Section 501(c)(3) provides tax-exempt status to an organization organized and operated
exclusively for a religious purpose.278 Although it provides for such exemption, federal income
tax law fails to define the terms “religious” or “religion” in its statutes or regulations, due
primarily to First Amendment concerns.279 Religious organizations are generally viewed as
being broader than just “churches” or “traditional houses of worship,” and include book
publishers, broadcasters, cemeteries, and other organizations.280 To further complicate matters,
exempt purposes listed in Section 501(c)(3) are not “mutually exclusive” in that a “separately
incorporated parochial school may be both ‘religious’ and ‘educational,’ and many typical
‘charitable’ activities may be under the control or sponsorship of a particular religion or
church.”281 The IRS is acutely aware of the constitutional ramifications of attempting to define
“religion” or “religious” narrowly, and, therefore, advises its revenue agents to interpret the
terms broadly, “encompassing even those sects that do not believe in a Supreme Being.”282
Accordingly, the IRS subscribes to this general rule: “in the absence of a clear showing that
beliefs or doctrines under consideration are not sincerely held by those professing or claiming
them as a religion, the Service cannot question the ‘religious’ nature of those beliefs.”283 In fact,
if a religious organization is denied exemption, it is typically on grounds other than meeting
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280
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 444 (3d ed.
2006).
281
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some definition of religion or religious, such as the private inurement prohibition or the
restrictions on lobbying and political campaign activity contained in Section 501(c)(3).284
Although the same Congressional and IRS trepidation is present in attempting to define a
“church,”285 some designation is necessary because of the unique treatment and protection that
churches receive under the Internal Revenue Code.286 In making this designation, the IRS
follows a checklist comprised of fourteen criteria or characteristics to determine whether an
organization constitutes a church.287 Among such criteria are a distinct legal existence, a
recognized creed and form of worship, a formal code of doctrine and discipline, a distinct
religious history, and ordained ministers selected after prescribed studies.288 Although the IRS
cautions that such criteria are not exclusive and, ultimately, it is a facts-and-circumstances
determination,289 the criterion most consistently relied on by courts in determining the existence
of a church is the presence or absence of an established and regular congregation.290 The IRS
provides in its continuing education materials that, “[i]n looking for a congregation, the central
focus is whether the organization’s membership is a coherent group of individuals or families
that join together to accomplish religious purposes or shared beliefs. The size of the
congregation is less important than its dynamic.”291
Although nearly all religious organizations are eligible for tax-exempt status under
Section 501(c)(3), only “churches, their integrated auxiliaries and conventions or associations of
churches” are presumed not to be private foundations,292 and thus, excepted from the notice
284
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requirements of Section 508 (i.e., a church does not need to file an application to be recognized
as exempt under Section 501(c)(3)).293 Churches are also relieved from filing annual information
returns with the IRS.294 In addition, the Internal Revenue Code confers upon churches special
procedural safeguards with respect to IRS examinations or audits.295 Churches are also
exempted from certain rules governing qualified retirement plans, and social security, selfemployment, and withholding taxes.296
A particular church’s activities typically comprise more than just making religious
services and worship available to its congregants. Many churches conduct activities such as
operating a school, seminary, or social service agency (e.g., day care), or conducting women’s or
children’s groups without forming a separate legal entity for such activities.297 Until such time
that an activity is incorporated or otherwise made part of a separate legal entity, it is considered a
component of the church, as a legal entity, and covered by the church’s exemption.298 Once a
new legal entity is formed to conduct such an activity, the reasons for which are typically
liability or administrative related, the entity needs to obtain its own tax-exempt status.299 This is
typically accomplished through the activity’s relationship to the church, which the Internal
Revenue Code classifies as an “integrated auxiliary.”300 An “integrated auxiliary” is defined by
regulation as a separate entity that is a charitable organization (e.g., a school, mission society, or
youth group), a public charity (as opposed to a private foundation),301 internally supported,302
and affiliated with a church or a convention or association of churches.303 An organization meets
the “affiliated” requirement if it is covered by a group exemption letter issued to a church or a
convention or association of churches,304 is operated, supervised or controlled by such church, or
pertinent facts and circumstances establish such an affiliation.305 Under prior regulatory law, an
typically receives its income from a broader segment of the general public in the form of gifts, contributions, or
receipts from performance of services. Furthermore, private foundations are subject to additional excise taxes under
I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945 (2006).
293
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organization that qualified as an integrated auxiliary had to engage in an activity that was
“exclusively religious.”306 Such standard was not met if the organization’s activity “was of a
nature other than religious that would serve as a basis for tax exemption” (e.g., educational or
scientific activity).307 However, the Eighth Circuit held that this requirement was not consistent
with Congressional intent, thereby concluding that a social service agency could constitute an
integrated auxiliary of a church.308
b.

Exception for a “Church”

The intent of the proposal set forth in this Article is to except churches from the proposed
nondiscrimination requirement. The primary reason for this exception is that the application of
such a requirement would likely violate the First Amendment’s free exercise clause in that it
could be interpreted as attempting to regulate religious belief.309 Furthermore, it is not the intent
of this Article’s proposal to control what members of churches believe or with whom they share
such beliefs. Consequently, an exception to the nondiscrimination requirement for churches
within Section 501(c)(3) would be needed.310 However, because the federal income tax law
definition of a church also encompasses integrated auxiliaries, who by definition can include
church-affiliated schools, universities, social service agencies, etc., the definition of a church for
purposes of the notice and annual reporting provisions of the Internal Revenue Code needs to be
tailored to exclude such separate, affiliated entities. Furthermore, to address situations where a
school, university or social service agency is conducted within the same legal entity as the
congregational church, the statutory use of “church” in Sections 508 and 6033 should be defined
to reflect the fourteen-point test promulgated by the IRS and adopted by the courts, with specific
emphasis on the criterion of an established and dynamic congregation.311 This Article’s proposal
can only effectively combat the kind of ongoing discrimination illustrated in Part I by limiting
the definition of a church to an organization contemplated by the fourteen-point test. Such a
limited definition will likely garner criticism by those who believe there are already too many
affiliated, which includes, but is not limited to: (i) the organization’s charter or bylaws reveal that it shares common
religious doctrines or practices with a church, (ii) such church or convention or association of churches has the
power to appoint, control or remove at least one of the organization’s officers or directors, (iii) its name indicates an
institutional relationship, and (iv) upon dissolution, its assets are to be distributed to such church or convention or
association of churches. Id.
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limitations on churches in the Internal Revenue Code.312 However, a limited definition of a
church for purposes of Sections 508 and 6033 does not preclude a broader definition of church
for other purposes within the Internal Revenue Code, as is currently done, for instance, in the
FICA tax provisions.313
The Supreme Court, in upholding the imposition of a racial nondiscrimination policy in
Bob Jones University, appeared to similarly appreciate the difference between a church and a
“religious” school by stating that “[w]e deal here only with religious schools – not with churches
or other purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying public support
to racial discrimination in education.”314 In addition, the Supreme Court rejected the university’s
claim that the denial of its tax exemption violates the Establishment Clause because it favors
religions that do not advocate racial discrimination.315 It provided the following response:
[A] regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it
‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’ The
IRS policy at issue here is founded on a ‘neutral, secular basis,’ and does not
violate the Establishment Clause. . . . In addition, as the Court of Appeals noted,
‘the uniform application of the rule to all religiously operated schools avoids the
necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into whether a racially restrictive
practice is the result of sincere religious belief.’316
It is certainly arguable that the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be employed to ensure
that a nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) is applied to all charitable
organizations, other than churches or “other purely religious institutions,” based on a
governmental interest to deny public support to charitable organizations that discriminate. By
limiting the definition of a church as stated above, a nondiscrimination requirement within
Section 501(c)(3) can truly accomplish its primary purpose – ensure that the stream of taxdeductible dollars received by charitable organizations are not used to discriminate against any
member of society.
An alternative solution may be to not alter the current definition and treatment of
churches and church-affiliated entities at all. According to a 1975 revenue ruling (issued after
the IRS announced that it would no longer grant or maintain exemptions to schools with racially
discriminatory policies),317 the public policy doctrine could be utilized to deny or revoke exempt
312
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status to a church or a separate affiliated entity that operated and controlled a school with a
racially discriminatory admissions policy.318 In the ruling, the IRS presented several scenarios
including a school (“X”) with a racially discriminatory admissions policy that was incorporated
as a separate entity, but affiliated with and controlled by a church, and a school with the same
policy operated directly within the church entity (“Y”).319 In the first scenario, the IRS held that
X was not operated exclusively for charitable purposes and therefore did not qualify for exempt
status under Section 501(c)(3), but this had no effect on the church’s exemption.320 In the second
scenario, the IRS concluded that there should be no disparate result just because the school was
operated within the church entity (Y). Accordingly, it found that Y was not exempt under
Section 501(c)(3).321 In a third scenario, the IRS similarly concluded that exempt status could
not be conferred to a church that operated two schools (one that was separately incorporated and
one that was operated within the same entity as the church), and asserted that it was required by
its religious tenets to maintain a racially discriminatory policy. The IRS relied on a line of
Supreme Court cases that conclude that although the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
bars government interference into religious beliefs and opinions, it does not necessarily “affect
the legal consequences otherwise attending a given practice or action that is not inherently
religious.”322 Based on this reasoning, similar conclusions could be reached with respect to taxexempt status if the proposed nondiscrimination requirement was applied to the above factual
scenarios. However, to date, the IRS conclusions set forth in the revenue ruling have not been
validated by a federal court.
4.

Other Potential Difficulties and Criticisms

Another potential difficulty or criticism with respect to the proposal set forth herein is
how it will apply to same-gender or same-religion organizations, such as a all-girls Catholic high
school or an organization directing its relief and educational programs at poverty-stricken
Kenyans immigrating to the United States. Will such organizations be denied tax-exempt status
318
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under an amended Section 501(c)(3) because they discriminate on the basis of gender or national
origin? Similar dilemmas immediately surfaced in the years surrounding the Bob Jones
University decision.323 In response, the IRS was reluctant to extent the public policy doctrine to
such situations;324 in part, because the doctrine fails to designate a clear source of public policy,
as discussed in Part II of this Article.325 Perhaps the IRS did not see such instances of
discrimination as being invidious or harmful, and thus outside the intended purposes and goals of
the public policy doctrine.
Accordingly, the best solution may lie with the definition of discrimination under the
statute; specifically, whether it is defined as policies or practices that are wrongful, harmful, or
invidious in some way. The proposed amendment to Section 501(c)(3) should contain a
legislative grant to the IRS, along with some clearly-defined parameters, to promulgate
regulations that set forth instances that do or do not constitute discrimination under the
legislative purposes of the statute. For instance, gender-based discrimination could be deemed
not to exist in same-sex schools due to proven pedagogical benefits and a lack of concerted effort
to specifically exclude the other gender. In addition, racial or national origin discrimination
could be deemed to not exist with respect to an organization whose mission has an established
record of combating poverty in an area of a city that happens to be comprised mostly of AfricanAmerican citizens or a particular immigrant population. Again, the lack of any evidence
establishing a concerted effort to exclude persons of other races or national origins may be
decisive. Ultimately, whether or not a particular policy, action, or course of actions constitutes
discrimination will be a facts-and-circumstances determination, borrowing standards and burdens
of proof from established federal civil rights laws and other nondiscrimination statutes.326
This point may be best illustrated by two General Counsel Memorandum (“GCM”) – one
issued before and the other immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones
University. In GCM 37462,327 the IRS concluded that a scholarship trust that restricted eligible
beneficiaries to Caucasian students furthers racial discrimination in education contrary to
established federal public policy. Notwithstanding, the IRS determined that it was doubtful that
administering such a trust would adversely impact the school’s exemption because it was de
minimus in relation to the school’s aggregate scholarship program.328
However, in
GCM 39082,329 the IRS revoked the “per se rule” in GCM 37462, concluding that scholarship
trusts that restrict eligibility to Caucasian students should be examined on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether racial discrimination is advanced. The IRS explained that, for instance, a
private trust that grants scholarships only to Caucasian students to enroll at a “predominantly
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minority school could be said actually to discourage racial discrimination in education.”330 The
IRS further concluded that the “well-established policy of promoting private educational trusts
should, on balance, prevail even where the benefits of the trust are limited to members of a
particular race.”331 In the GCM, the IRS found it persuasive that the school charged with
administering the trust adopted and maintained a racial nondiscrimination policy and the trust
accounted for a small share of the total financial assistance available to students.
This Article’s proposal may also be criticized as unnecessary in light of the number of
state and local nondiscrimination laws.332 However, such laws apply in varying degrees and in
limited situations, such as only in government employment or public housing, and may not apply
directly to charitable organizations. In addition, such laws are constantly subject to challenge by
lawsuits and legislative repeal and, therefore, cannot ensure the same comprehensive application
to all charitable organizations that can be achieved through an amendment to
Section 501(c)(3).333 Notwithstanding their importance and effectiveness in combating all kinds
of discrimination, state and local nondiscrimination laws do not directly or effectively assist in
achieving one of the primary purposes of this Article’s proposal – that the stream of taxdeductible dollars received by charitable organizations are not used to maintain a discriminatory
policy or otherwise effect discrimination against any member of society.
V. CONCLUSION
In Part I of this Article, a simple but important question was posed – should a charitable
organization continue to enjoy the benefits of tax-exempt status if it engages in discrimination?
After illustrating the apparently common practice of discrimination by charitable organizations
and the failure of existing law to combat it, this Article answers that question with a resounding
“No!” Fundamental to this Article’s proposal is the notion that discrimination by a charitable
organization is intrinsically incompatible with that organization’s charitable purpose and
mission. In filling the current void in federal income tax with respect to such discrimination, this
Article’s proposal attempts to transform Section 501(c)(3) into the gold standard for all taxexempt organizations, ensuring that their beneficiaries are as diverse as the taxpaying public
from whom they draw their support.
By not relying on an ill-defined public policy doctrine or federal civil rights laws that are
questionably applicable, a nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) offers a more
comprehensive solution to the problem of discriminatory policies and practices of charitable
organizations. It sends a strong message to potential and existing charitable organizations that
330
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discrimination is fundamentally inconsistent with tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) and
more in concert with society’s notion of what constitutes a charity. As the Supreme Court stated
in Bob Jones University, a charitable organization must “be in harmony with the public interest”
and its purpose “must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine
any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.”334 Furthermore, a nondiscrimination
requirement ensures that the stream of tax-deductible dollars (i.e., generated by the Section 170
charitable contributions deduction) received by charitable organizations is not used to
discriminate against any member or segment of society.
The proposal is not totally free from difficulties and challenges. However, by permitting
organizations that wish to discriminate to qualify for exempt status under Section 501(c)(4) as a
social welfare organization, a nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) should
withstand any constitutionally-based challenges (i.e., alleged First Amendment violations) or
criticisms that it effectively squelches pluralism. To ensure that such requirement combats
discrimination comprehensively, genuine consideration needs to be given to redefining the term
“church” for purposes of the notice and annual reporting provisions under Sections 508 and
6033, respectively. The proposal specifically excepts churches from the nondiscrimination
requirement due primarily to First Amendment free exercise concerns. By tailoring the
definition to the fourteen-point test articulated by the IRS and adopted by courts, with a specific
emphasis on the criterion of an established and dynamic congregation, church-affiliated schools,
universities, social service agencies, and other organizations that currently constitute “integrated
auxiliaries” of churches under the Internal Revenue Code will not be shielded from the proposed
nondiscrimination requirement. Additional consideration will also need to be given to the
intended meaning of discrimination with respect to same-gender, same-national-origin, or
similarly focused organizations that otherwise operate exclusively for exempt purposes under
Section 501(c)(3).
To conclude, the immortal words of President John F. Kennedy, in his message to
Congress calling for the enactment of Title VI, are particularly pertinent to the proposal herein:
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races
[colors, and national origins] contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial [color or national origin]
discrimination.335
The inclusion of an expansive nondiscrimination requirement within Section 501(c)(3) is a
necessary step in ensuring that charitable organizations do not use public funds to encourage,
entrench or subsidize discrimination of any kind against any member or segment of society.
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